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TEXTUALISM AT WORK
George H. Taylor*
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.
- Justice Holmes1
A contract is not just a piece of paper. Just as a single word is the skin of a
living thought, so is a contract evidence of a vital, ongoing relationship
between human beings. An at-will employee . . . is not merely performing
an existing contract; she is constantly remaking that contract.
-. Justice Stevens2
INTRODUCTION
Much of the debate about textualism8 as a method of statutory
interpretation centers on its propriety. Is it appropriate to reject re-
course to legislative history?4 Does a textualist methodology lead to
determinate judgments?5 Less attended, however, are the implica-
tions of textualism for subsequent judicial interpretations of the
same statute. Once the Supreme Court has issued its interpretation
of a statute, it would seem that the basic task of textualism has been
accomplished. According to this view, interpretations of the statute
in later cases should proceed without difficulty, because they are
* Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A., Brown; M.A., Ph.D. cand.,
University of Chicago; J.D., Harvard. I owe particular thanks for the help of Candice Hoke, Juliet
Kostritsky, and Ed Symons. For their research assistance at various points, my great debt is to
Nancy Burkoff, Bill Freshwater, Alex Gruskos, Ed Meehan, Chris Otto, Laurel Peters, Becky
Spangler, and Ann Sinsheimer-Weeks.
1. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
2, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 221 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
3. Textualism endorses constrained judicial decision based on an interpretation of the language
and structure of the text and basically rejects reference to extra-textual evidence such as legisla-
tive history. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
621 (1990).
4. See, e.g., id. at 625 (arguing that legislative history is "at best, secondary and supporting
evidence of statutory meaning").
5. This set of issues is explored in a separate article. See George H. Taylor, Structural Textu-
alism, 75 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995, on file with Boston University Law Review).
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merely applying in more precise fashion principles already enunci-
ated. The Court's textualist decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, a case interpreting § 1981, ?exemplifies this line of think-
ing. In Patterson, all that the Court required of the lower courts
was that they give "a fair and natural reading" to the statute, "not
strain in an undue manner the statute's language,"8 and accord the
statutory terms "their plain and common sense meaning." 9 The
Court confidently declared its belief "that the lower courts will have
little difficulty applying the straightforward principles that we an-
nounce today."10
Through an analysis of the nearly 600 post-Patterson cases," this
Article evaluates whether the Court's confidence was warranted and
concludes that it was not. A textualist approach must confront more
directly the difficult correlation between the meaning and applica-
tion of a statute. The post-Patterson cases provide an unusually rich
constellation of cases with which to examine whether the relation-
ship between the meaning and application of a statutory text is
more accurately characterized as one of subsumption, as textualism
would seem to imply, or one of interrelation. To the extent that, as
the post-Patterson cases evidence, the meaning of a text is in fact
tested and potentially transformed during the process of application,
this transformation poses a significant challenge to the textualist
project." If applying statutory language in new cases extends and
changes the statute's meaning, then the meaning is not provided
conclusively by the statutory language, and a court's role cannot be
restricted to mere explication of previously ascertained meaning.'8
6. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
8. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185. Although the specific context of the Court's discussion was the
interpretation of one aspect of § 1981, the Court'seemed to treat these claims as an illustration of
a generalizable interpretive model. Id.
9. Id. at 185 n.6.
10. Id.
11. See infra Appendix (listing the post-Patterson cases and a coded summary of their
holdings).
12. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrode the Patterson decision, that does not di-
minish the analysis. See Pub.L. 101-166 § 101(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991). The Patterson
holding may not remain, but the textualist methodology employed there endures.
13. This Article focuses on the practical evidence of the correlation between meaning and ap-
plication. Elsewhere I evaluate the more theoretical dimensions of this interrelation. See George
H. Taylor, Meaning and Application (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Post-Patter-
son cases do not necessarily represent the only model of application at work in statutory interpre-
tation to maintain that the model challenges textualism.
[Vol. 44:259
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I. THE PATTERSON DECISION
The Patterson decision was primarily directed" toward determin-
ing the amplitude of rights protected under § 1981's prohibition
against racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of con-
tracts. 15 In a ruling which surprised many,16 the Court narrowly in-
terpreted these rights and held that Brenda Patterson's charge of
racial harassment was not actionable under § 1981.11 The Court
ruled that § 1981's protection of the right to make a contract "ex-
tends only to the formation of a contract, but not to problems that
may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment."1 8
The right to enforce a contract, in turn, is restricted to protection
against racial discrimination only of an individual's "ability to en-
force through legal process his or her established contract rights." 19
The judicial repercussions of the Court's interpretation of § 1981
14. Two other substantive issues faced the Patterson Court. First, the Court discussed the ap-
plicability of § 1981 to private contracts. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171-75. Second, the Court dis-
cussed the burdens of proof applicable to § 1981 claims. Id. at 186-88. Neither of these issues is
directly pertinent to the themes of this Article and, therefore, does not receive attention.
15. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like pun-
ishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
16. Prior to the Court's ruling, over twenty decisions in the courts of appeals had discussed the
availability of racial harassment actions under § 1981. See George M. Sullivan, Countervailing
Activism? Employment Cases Evokes Supreme Court Crisis, 24 GONz. L. REV. 31, 31-32 & 31
n.4 (1988-89) (presenting these statistics and listing the decisions). Only the Fourth Circuit deci-
sion from which Brenda Patterson appealed held racial harassment not actionable under that stat-
ute. Id.; see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), af'd in part &
vacated in part, remanded, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
17. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 178. I return later to the Court's discussion of Patterson's § 1981
promotion claim. See infra text accompanying note 135.
18. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176. The Court continued:
The statute prohibits, when based on race, the refusal to enter into a contract with
someone, as well as the offer to make a contract only on discriminatory terms. But the
right to make a contract does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to
conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established, including
breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working condi-
tions. Such postformation conduct does not involve the right to make a contract, but
rather the performance of established contract obligations and the conditions of con-
tinuing employment, matters more naturally governed by state contract law and Title
VII.
Id. at 176-77. The quotations contain the Court's entire discussion in this section of the right to
make contracts.
19. Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
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have been dramatic and extensive. As already mentioned, the Pat-
terson decision has affected the viability of claims in nearly 600 sub-
sequent cases.2 0 Complaints initiating these cases contained over 960
§ 1981 claims; 21 approximately 825 of these claims were dismissed
on the basis of Patterson.2 In some striking individual cases, the
retroactive application of Patterson required the reversal of prior
jury verdicts which resulted in the loss of plaintiffs' damages awards
ranging from hundreds of thousands to a million dollars.2 3 The post-
Patterson decisions forcefully point out that inquiries into interpre-
tive methods are neither remote nor merely academic exercises.
No one has previously undertaken a systematic assessment of the
post-Patterson cases, but the view that Patterson failed to sweep
away interpretive confusion and enunciate easily applied rules is en-
dorsed by other commentators. For instance, in one post-Patterson
opinion, Judge Richard Posner stated:
We show no disrespect for the Supreme Court by suggesting that the scope
of Patterson is uncertain. The glory of the Anglo-American system of adju-
dication is that general principles are tested in the crucible of concrete con-
troversies. A court cannot be assumed to address and resolve in the case in
which it first lays down a rule every controversy within the semantic reach
of the rule.2
4
20. See infra Appendix.
21. Some cases presented more than one § 1981 claim, for example, both failure to promote
and discriminatory discharge claims. See infra Appendix.
22. See infra Appendix.
23. See, e.g., Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1993) (revers-
ing jury verdict awarding $1,000,000 in damages); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515
(11 th Cir. 1991) (reversing trial verdict awarding nearly $465,000); McKnight v. General Motors
Corp., 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing jury verdict awarding $610,000), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 919 (1991). The vagaries of retroactivity rules are particularly telling in the McKnight case.
The Seventh Circuit held that McKnight's trial verdict had to be reversed because the Supreme
Court's Patterson decision was retroactive. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 108. McKnight's case re-
mained alive after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which again made General Motors'
actions against McKnight unlawful, but a lower court, following recent Seventh Circuit precedent,
held that this statute, unlike a court decision, should not be applied retroactively. McKnight v.
General Motors Corp., No. 87-C-248, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6803, at *8-10 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 22,
1992) affd, 973 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1270 (1993). Subsequently, in
Rivers v. Roadway Express Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994), the Supreme Court settled that the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 should not be applied retroactively to § 1981 claims. Id. at 1518.
24. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989), on remand, No. 86 C
9460, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16653 (N.D. 111. Dec. 4, 1990), affd, 963 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1992).
Judge Posner's statement has been cited with approval by a number of courts. See, e.g., Daniels v.
Pipefitters' Ass'n. Local Union No. 5971, 945 F.2d 906, 913 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1514 (1992); Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 638 n.19 (8th Cir. 1990); Crader
v. Concordia College, 724 F. Supp. 558, 563 n.7 (N.D. III. 1989).
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Other courts and judges have independently confirmed the confu-
sions generated by the Patterson opinion. 5 Commentators have
echoed these observations as well. 6
25. See, e.g., Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1259 (6th Cir. 1990)
(Boggs, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme Court decisions interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and its
reach are not a model of clarity."); Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp., 748 F. Supp. 1484, 1485 (D.
Kan. 1990) (noting that despite Patterson's anticipation, "[tihe lower courts . . . have reached
differing conclusions on what specific acts of discrimination may be remedied under section 1981
in light of Patterson"), aff'd, 969 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. McCleod, 748 F. Supp.
831, 834 (S.D. Ala. 1990) ("[E]specially when applied outside of the specific factual context there
presented, [Patterson] does not provide a bright line rule leading to easy answers to all questions
concerning the scope of § 1981."); Ward v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, No. B-86-
0606-CA, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7991, at *2 n.l (E.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 1990) ("It does not appear
from the cases this court has pled that Justice Kennedy's hopeful prophecy has been fulfilled
26. Julius Chambers, Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
was particularly forceful in stating that:
Although Patterson has resulted in the dismissal of hundreds of claims and has
caused the lower courts to question the validity of almost every claim under § 1981,
the decision also left many unresolved questions which have created chaos and uncer-
tainty in the lower courts and further obstacles for victims pursuing relief for discrim-
ination . . . Patterson . . . has spawned a host of novel and unprecedented issues
about the meaning of § 1981 which has led to conflict and confusion among the lower
courts . . . . The impact of Patterson is complicated considerably by the fact that the
majority opinion raises fair more questions than it resolves.
1 The Civil Rights Act of 1990, Joint Hearings on H.R. 4000 Before the House Committee on
Education and Labor and the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 143, 156, 157, 181 (1990) [hereinafter Joint
House Hearings] (prepared statement of Julius Chambers). Statements of other commentators
are to a like effect. Before the same Joint House Hearings, for example, then president-elect of the
American Bar Association John J. Curtin noted the need for statutory amendments to "eliminate
[the) considerable confusion and conflict among the lower courts over the scope of [§ 1981] after
Patterson." Id. at 522, 534-35 (prepared statement of John J. Curtin); see also Mack A. Player,
What Hath Patterson Wrought? A Study in the Failure to Understand the Employment Contract,
6 LAB. LAW. 183, 190 (1990) (noting that "the lower courts have reached different constructions
of Patterson"); Harvey L. Cohen, Note, In the Wake of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The
Treacherous and Shifting Shoals of Employment Discrimination, 67 DENv. U. L. REV. 557, 557
(1990) (observing "the current chaos that reigns among the lower federal courts in the interpreta-
tion of Patterson"); Woody L. Lay, Note, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: A Narrowing of
Remedies for the Employment Discrimination Plaintiff, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 995, 1009
(1990) ("Clearly the Patterson Court was less than prophetic when the Court stated that the
lower courts would have little trouble applying the straightforward principles in the opinion.").
In case it might be thought that the views of someone like Julius Chambers were skewed, as he
was acting not only on the behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund but also
argued Brenda Patterson's case before the Supreme Court, it is instructive to note that one of the
amici briefs on the opposite side of the case likewise thought that after Patterson "[t]here is chaos
out there." Symposium, The Supreme Court and Local Government Law, 6 ToURo L. REV. 55,
69 (1989) (quoting Paul Kamenar). In Patterson, Kamenar was on the amicus brief for the
Washington Legal Foundation. Id. at 65. Whereas for Chambers the solution to Patterson was a
statutory amendment reviving the pre-Patterson construction of § 1981, for Kamenar the only
solution was a reversal of the Patterson Court's upholding of Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976), which extended § 1981's coverage to private acts of discrimination. Symposium, supra, at
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The inquiry into the various ways the meaning of § 1981 as re-
vealed by Patterson has been applied in subsequent cases is predi-
cated upon the Patterson Court's ruling that § 1981 protects two
separate rights: 7 the right to make contracts and the right to en-
force contracts. 8 The post-Patterson cases track this division. Be-
cause of their particular significance to a textualist methodology, I
restrict attention to post-Patterson claims arising under an alleged
right to make a contract and set aside claims of a right to enforce a
contract.2 9 Post-Patterson cases examining the possible repercus-
69.
If, as these comments reveal, one difficulty in the post-Patterson cases was application of the
meaning of § 1981 established by the Patterson Court, another danger was that the lower courts
would read the implications of Patterson too broadly. Here the problem rests not so much with the
Supreme Court's textualism as with the failure of the lower courts to pay sufficient attention to
the confines of the Court's holding. Again to quote Julius Chambers:
[A] number of lower court decisions read as though the central purpose of Patterson
was simply to throw out as many § 1981 race discrimination claims as possible. Al-
though some courts have allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaints to include alle-
gations that may now be required by Patterson, other courts have dismissed § 1981
claims with an alacrity bordering on enthusiasm.
1 Joint House Hearings, supra, at 156 n.20 (prepared statement of Julius Chambers); see also
Player, supra, at 190 ("The weight of authority appears to construe Patterson broadly, far beyond
its holding or its language, to the point that many courts seem to view section 1981 as protecting
nothing more than discriminatory hiring."). But see Kriegel v. Home Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 1538,
1540 (N.D. Ga. 1990) ("The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Patterson 'our society's deep commit-
ment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of his or her skin.'
Given the strength and importance of that commitment, the Court will not infer a more restrictive
construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 than the Supreme Court has adopted.").
27. This separation is not an ineluctable interpretation of the statutory language. See infra note
74 (discussing Steven Burton's contention that the right to make and enforce contracts "is a sin-
gular reference to the legal power of contract").
28. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176 (1989).
29. Claims under the right to enforce a contract generally involve alleged employer obstructions
of employees' attempts to enforce their contracts, including employer retaliation or retaliatory
discharge. Of the approximately 960 total § 1981 claims brought post-Patterson, approximately
125 alleged a right to enforce a contract, and of these, over 100 have been dismissed. See infra
Appendix. Just as with the Patterson Court's definition of the making of a contract, no one doubts
that Patterson "suggest[ed] a considerably narrower interpretation of section 1981's term 'en-
force' than might previously have been understood." Mozee v. American Commercial Marine
Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1053 (7th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 644 (1993). Critical is that the enforcement clause does not protect against any
kind of racial discrimination or retaliation after the contract is formed but at best only protects
those impediments preventing enforcement of contract rights protected under § 1981. See. e.g.,
Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 945 F.2d 906, 913 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 111-12 (7th Cir.
1990) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991). Under this logic, a retaliation claim would
not be viable if it protested conduct not otherwise protected under § 1981. But see Charles A.
Shanor & Samuel A. Marcosson, Battleground for a Divided Court: Employment Discrimination
in the Supreme Court, 1988-89, 6 LAB. LAW. 145, 173 (1990) (presenting the authors', EEOC
General Counsel and EEOC attorney, arguments that these cases should be protected under
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sions of that decision on other clauses of § 1981 ("same right...
to sue, be parties, give evidence ,. . . and shall be subject to like
punishment . . .," etc.), are not examined. 0
The Supreme Court appeared to hold that the application of
§ 1981's "right . . . to make . . . contracts" would pose little diffi-
culty"' because that phrase bears a clear, easily ascertainable mean-
ing.82 Section 1981 protects against discriminatory action only dur-
§ 1981).
Remaining interpretive issues include whether a right of enforcement survives if the employer's
obstruction of legal access is less than complete. Compare Valdez v. Mercy Hosp., 961 F.2d 1401,
1404 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that since the employee was present in court, legal access was not
impaired) and Carter v. South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that when
an employer discourages an employee from legal action, he has not "impaired" or "impeded" the
employee's ability to enforce the contract), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260 (1991) with Harvis v.
Roadway Exp. Inc., 973 F.2d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[the] fact that [the em-
ployer] allowed formal 'access' to legal process does not imply that it could never be impairing the
employee's 'ability to enforce through legal process' "), affd on other grounds sub nom. Rivers v.
Roadway Exp. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994).
Another contested issue is whether retaliation, especially retaliatory discharge, survives after
Patterson. For example, in Harvis, Judge Siler dissented from the majority holding that a claim of
retaliatory discharge does survive, quoting the following reasoning of the Fifth Circuit:
"Were we to hold that section 1981 still encompasses retaliatory discharge, we would
be encouraging litigation to determine what the employer's subjective motive was
when he fired the employee: was it to retaliate or 'merely' to discriminate? This would
be pointless. Both motives are equally invidious, and the employee suffers the same
harm. Because section 1981 no longer covers retaliatory termination, all suits for dis-
crimination must be brought under Title VII."
Harvis, 973 F.2d at 497 (Siler, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (quoting Carter, 912
F.2d at 840-41). The Harvis majority holding creates a circumstance where retaliatory discharge
remains viable under § 1981's enforcement clause, whereas most courts have held that discrimi-
natory discharge, an issue under the contract clause, does not survive. See infra notes 199-201 and
accompanying text. For reasons of emphasis, my argument in the text follows the Patterson Court
in separating the right to make and the right to enforce a contract, but the Harvis holding sug-
gests that the Court's separation itself presents complicated problems in application.
For more general discussion of § 1981 enforcement cases through 1990, see Caroline R. Fred-
erickson, Note, The Misreading of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: The Diminishing Scope of
Section 1981, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 908-13, 914-16 (1991).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). For the full text of § 1981, see svnpra note 15. The amplitude
of these clauses has received little attention. For post-Patterson discussions, see Spencer v.
Casavilla, 839 F. Supp. 1014, 1017-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Franceschi v. Hyatt Corp., 782 F. Supp.
712 (D. Puerto Rico 1992); Ford v. City of Rockford, No. 88 C 20323, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15825, at *8-9 (N.D. I1. Oct. 15, 1992); Watley v. Mooney, No. 91-1115-B, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8503 (D. Kan. May 22, 1992); Fowler v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228 (D. Md.
1989); Pressley v. Haeger, No. 83 C 3974, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1031 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15,
1989); Barry L. Refsin, Comment, The Lost Clauses of Section 1981: A Source of Greater Pro-
tection After Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1230-46 (1990).
31. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185 n.6.
32. Several courts have described the Court's demarcation as a "bright-line" rule. See, e.g.,
Coleman v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (S.D. Ala. 1990) (asserting that "this
Court finds clear support for a 'bright line' rule which confines the actionable case under § 1981
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ing the formation of a contract. Once the contractual relationship is
established, the issue is no longer one of the right to make a con-
tract but of "the performance of established contract obligations
and the conditions of continuing employment.""3 The dividing line,
then, is between conduct during contract formation and "postforma-
tion conduct. 31 4 Because the racial harassment Brenda Patterson al-
leged she experienced involved her employer's contract performance,
this postformation conduct although "reprehensible though it be if
true, is not actionable under § 1981."85 As we shall see, in numer-
ous subsequent cases the lower courts found it requires little reflec-
tion to extend the Court's holding and dismiss such claims as dis-
criminatory discharge because "[t]he Court was clear in stating that
§ 1981 'does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation
of a contract . . . .' "6
The question is whether the dividing line between formation con-
duct and postformation conduct is so easily drawn. Is it sufficient,
for example, to say that discriminatory discharge claims are not ac-
to those involving the actual making or enforcement of a contract"); Carter v. O'Hare Hotel
Investors, No. 88 C 10713, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2439, at 014 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1990) (stat-
ing that "Patterson draws a bright-line between §1981 coverage of conduct that occurs before a
contract is formed and conduct that occurs thereafter."); Crader v. Concordia College, 724 F.
Supp. 558, 562 (N.D. III. 1989) (stating that claims stemming from "race-based harassment,
discipline and discharge . . . are expressly barred by Patterson . . .[but] [a]s to . . .discrimina-
tory failure to promote . however, Patterson does not state the rule in such bright-line
terms.").
33. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177. The Court stated that the terms and conditions of continuing
employment are "more naturally governed by state contract law and Title VII." Id. This case
arose from the following facts. Ms. Patterson had worked as a teller at the McLean Credit Union
for ten years. Id. at 169. She alleged that her employer harassed her, did not promote her, and
had terminated her all because she was black. Id.
34. Id. at 177, 179-80.
35. Id. at 179.
36. Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 960 (1992), affid, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir.
1992); accord Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 1991);
Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1257 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1250 (1991); Hull v. Case Corp., No. 93-1209-CIV, 1993 WL 603554 at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec.
13, 1993) ("It is well-settled that prior to the amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
section 1981 did not provide a cause of action for any conduct that occurred after the initial hiring
of an individual."); Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721, 723 (N.D. II1. 1989) (involving an
action for discriminatory discharge) ("[U]nder Patterson, once an individual has secured employ-
ment, the statute's protection of the right to make a contract is at an end."); Sofferin v. American
Airlines, 717 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. I11. 1989) ("[T]he Patterson Court refused to extend the
protections afforded the right to make a contract to reach 'conduct by the employer after the
contract relation has been established, ... '") (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177), affid, revd,
and remanded in part, 923 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1991), on remand, 785 F. Supp. 780 (N.D. Ill.
1992).
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tionable because they arise after a contractual relationship has been
formed, when at least some promotion claims are actionable despite
the fact that they too obviously arise after the employment relation-
ship is established?3 7 Perhaps one must inquire further and examine
whether at the time of discharge or promotion a "new" relationship
is formed and is, therefore, actionable. How simple is it to distin-
guish at what points a contract is made or remade and so brought
under the protections of the right to make a contract? In attempting
to apply Patterson's interpretation of the meaning of § 1981, the
post-Patterson cases demonstrate the continuing degree to which ap-
plication of this meaning has required its reassessment and reformu-
lation. At the same time that these cases raise the substantive ques-
tion of when a contract is re-made, they also raise the interpretive
question of when, in the process of application, a statute's meaning
is re-made.3 8
Promotion claims have caused the most problems for courts trying
to apply the contract formation test, 9 and transfer and demotion
claims have created difficulties as well.4 0 While courts have uni-
formly held discriminatory discharge claims not to be viable under
§ 1981, the reasoning behind these conclusions is troubling."1 But
application of the Court's test presents enigmas even at the moment
when a contractual relationship is first formed.
II. REFUSAL TO CONTRACT CLAIMS
After Patterson, § 1981 clearly continued to cover situations
where a defendant refused to contract because of discriminatory an-
imus or attempted to contract on explicitly discriminatory terms.42
37. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
38. I would argue that the two approaches are related. See infra note 250 and accompanying
text.
39. See infra notes 106-54 and accompanying text (discussing post-Patterson promotion).
40. See infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text (discussing transfer claims) & 166-178 (dis-
cussing demotion claims).
41. See infra notes 199-249 and accompanying text (discussing post-Patterson discharge cases).
42. See. e.g., Duane v. GEICO, 37 F.3d 1036 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that refusal of insurance
company to extend homeowners' insurance to Australian citizen constituted a refusal to contract,
extending § 1981 to discrimination based on alienage); Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 527-
28 (11 th Cir. 1994) (holding that discrimination by petroleum distributor in awarding gas station
dealership would constitute discriminatory refusal to contract under § 1981); Daniels v. Pipefit-
ters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597, 945 F.2d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a union hiring
hall's discriminatory referral practice constituted discriminatory refusal to hire), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1514 (1992); Walker v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 885 F.2d 867 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
if black pharmacist received lower starting salary and lower night-shift differential than compara-
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But other cases involving initial contract formation present greater
difficulties. Assume, for example, that a court is presented with a
case where a controversy does not arise over distinguishing the mo-
ments of an employer's contract formation conduct from his or her
postformation conduct. Can the latter behavior be used to implicate
the discriminatory nature of the former? In his Patterson dissent,
Justice Brennan argued that postformation conduct, if "sufficiently
severe or pervasive," could properly be cited "to belie any claim that
the contract was entered into in a racially neutral manner."4 The
Court majority resisted in order to prevent a plaintiff from "boot-
strap[ing] a challenge to the conditions of employment (actionable,
if at all, under Title VII) into a claim under § 1981 . . . ."" While
the Court did accept that postformation conduct could be "used as
evidence that a divergence in the explicit terms of particular con-
tracts is explained by racial animus,"45 it is unclear whether atten-
tion to postformation conduct as evidence of covert discriminatory
intent to contract would satisfy the Court's interpretation of
§ 1981."
Note the potential dangers if evidence of postformation conduct is
bly situated whites, this would constitute discriminatory making of a contract) (dismissed on mer-
its), upon further consideration, 981 F.2d 1253 (4th Cir. 1992); Mitchell v. Associated Bldg.
Contractors, Inc., 884 F.2d 1392 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that an employer's maintenance of a
strict maximum hiring quota of minorities was discriminatory).
43. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 207-08 (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 184. While generalizing too broadly, the court in Dangerfield v. Mission Press, 50
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1171 (N.D. Il1. July 27, 1989), elucidated the objection here:
If a plaintiff can rely on postformation conduct to show the employer's state of mind
at the time of contracting, and thereby sue under § 1981, then Patterson is essen-
tially a nullity. In every suit, a plaintiff could allege that the employer intended all
along to discriminate based on race, and that the postformation conduct is proof of
the unspoken intent. Section 1981 would in that case be used to expose the exact
same conduct as Patterson disallows, except that the question would be whether the
subsequent conduct established a discriminatory state of mind at the time of con-
tracting. Plaintiff, in other words, could accomplish indirectly what Patterson directly
prohibits. The result in Patterson cannot be so easily avoided.
Id. at 1172-73.
45. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
46. Compare Patterson v. Intercoast Management of Hartford, Inc., 918 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that postformation conduct could not be used as evidence of § 1981 violation
where alleged discriminatory contract terms were covert rather than overt) and West v. First Pa.
Bank, No. 89-4730, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9339, at *7-9 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 1990) (refusing to
use discriminatory postformation conduct as evidence of discrimination at the time of contract
formation to black employees absent explicitly different contract terms) with English v. General
Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 628, 631-32 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that Patterson reference to overt
discriminatory term was illustrative rather than exhaustive) and Montgomery v. Atlanta Family
Restaurants, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1575, 1584 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (citing English).
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barred from being used to prove discriminatory intent at contract
formation. An unscrupulous employer could simply hire a minority
applicant on facially neutral terms, disguise their original discrimi-
natory intentions until sometime - a day, week, month? - later,
and then overtly discriminate against or terminate the employee.
"The right to make contracts created by § 1981 would be rendered
illusory if, by an arcane and semantic distinction, an employer is
required to respect a prospective employee's right to make contracts,
yet is permitted to terminate a contract a few moments after the
contract has been in existence.""' If the Patterson Court was con-
cerned that recourse to postformation conduct would negate
§ 1981's limitation to protecting only the right to make a contract,
lower courts are worried about the reverse: that attention only to the
moment of contract may "effectively annihilate the right to make
contracts."' 8 For many, Patterson's formalistic distinction between
contract formation and postformation conduct leads to troublesome
and contentious applications.
These worries about the logical coherence and constancy of the
Patterson differentiation between contract formation and postforma-
tion conduct are not merely hypothetical. A number of post-Patter-
son cases have hinged on the determination of whether discrimina-
tory conduct that occurred after the point of contract formation in
fact provided evidence of discrimination at the time the contract
47. Ginwright v. United Sch. Dist. No. 457, 756 F. Supp. 1458, 1472 (D. Kan. 1991). Accord
Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1530-31 (11 th Cir. 1991) (Clark, J., concurring)
(arguing that common sense dictates that if a discriminatory refusal to hire claim can be brought
under § 1981, then so can a discriminatory discharge claim); Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n,
931 F.2d 1565, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Wald, J., dissenting) ("[I~f § 1981 prohibits an employer
from refusing to hire an applicant because of her race, yet allows the employer tofire that person
the next day because of her race, then the law's promise. . . is empty."), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 960
(1992), affd, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 639 (8th
Cir. 1990) (arguing that this interpretation is "absurd . . . [and] would annihilate the right to
make contracts"), vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 914 (1991), rev'd and remanded, 946 F.2d
1344 (8th Cir. 1991), motion to vacate denied, 952 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct.
1255 (1992), rev'd, 982 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1642 (1994);
English v. General Dev. Corp., 717 F. Supp. 628, 632 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[E]mployers would be
free to disguise discrimination at the time of contract formation until after the employer has hired
the employee. Through such machinations, the employer would be able to escape damages liability
for acts prohibited by § 1981, even post-Patterson."). But see Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1572 (ruling
that if an employee is terminated quickly, then there is viable § 1981 claim since discrimination
was implicit in the making of the contract); Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d
1255, 1258 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that even if immediate discharge, Title VII and state civil
rights actions remain available), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991).
48. Hicks. 902 F.2d at 639.
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was formed.4 9 Even more complex have been cases resting on assess-
ment of when, exactly, the time of contract formation transpired.
Consider the following. An African-American woman had a sched-
uled appointment at a hair salon.' 0 Upon arrival she found her
scheduled beautician was not able to perform (because of illness),
and a substitute operator refused to perform because of the woman's
race.51 Did the refusal to serve constitute a refusal to contract or
was it postformation conduct? 2 Or consider the situation where
49. Was a hospital's alleged failure to assist a minority doctor in developing his private practice
after joining the staff a breach of contract or an implied contract term? See, e.g., Snowden v.
Millinocket Regional Hosp., 727 F. Supp. 701, 706-08 (D. Me. 1990) (holding employer's inac-
tion in assisting an employee to establish his private practice involved discriminatory performance
of a contract and so not a viable claim under § 1981). After servicing a city contract for approxi-
mately two months, a Hispanic plaintiff was told that her contract, part of a minority set-aside
program, was going to be canceled because she was not black. Torres v. City of Chicago, 730 F.
Supp. 106, 107 (N.D. Ill. 1989). Was this termination postformation conduct or a covert contract
term? The Torres court held that the city's cancellation of the contract because Torres was His-
panic and not black was postformation conduct and therefore not actionable under § 1981. Id. at
108.
50. Perry v. Command Performance, 913 F.2d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 1990).
51. Id.
52. The court noted:
[T]he record is inadequate to determine if the refusal to serve plaintiff occurred after
the contract was made or was concurrent with the making of the contract. Arguably,
an appointment for hair salon services is merely an invitation to negotiate, and that
acceptance of the offer occurs simultaneously to the performance of the contract
.... [On remand] [t]he court may wish to consider such factors as industry practice
and the expectations of the parties to the instant case. . . . [T]he court must [also]
give the parties an opportunity to present evidence as to whether th[e] contract was
grounded on discriminatory terms, i.e., to provide services only if a hairdresser were
available who would be willing to wash and set a black patron's hair.
Id. at 101-02.
On remand the district court dismissed the § 1981 claim because it classified the offensive con-
duct as occurring postformation. It held:
An enforceable contract exists where parties intend to conclude a binding agreement,
and the essential terms are certain enough to provide basis for an appropriate remedy.
• . . Upon Plaintiff's arrival at Defendant salon for her pre-arranged 12:00 p.m. ap-
pointment . . . , Defendant's assistant manager confirmed that the "wash and set"
services scheduled to be performed for Plaintiff by the assistant manager would be
rendered to the Plaintiff, although by another hairstylist, and Plaintiff agreed. The
services to be rendered were clearly defined and Plaintiff had impliedly agreed to pay
the standard fee for that basic service. At that point, a race-neutral contract was
established between Plaintiff and Defendant for hairstyling services. The discrimina-
tory conduct on the part of [the substitute beautician] occurred after Plaintiff and
Defendant had established a contract relation.
Perry v. Command Performance, No. 89-2284, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4019, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 27, 1991) affd, 945 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1166 (1992). The
court apparently did not contemplate whether the parties had established a contract at the time of
the phone call establishing the hair appointment.
A comparable effect is in the following case. A woman called a rental car company to reserve a
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black plaintiffs purchased several items at a store, presented the
cashier with a check, and the cashier recorded their race on the
check."3 Again, did the alleged discrimination occur at the time of
or after contract formation? 54 Or comtemplate the circumstance of
an employee who continues her job several weeks after a new em-
ployer takes over the business, but then faces an alleged discrimina-
tory "discharge" when the employer has the opportunity to examine
the operation of her specific department. Should this be treated as a
discriminatory discharge or rather as a discriminatory failure by the
new employer to hire her? 5 '
Certainly, as the decisions in these cases reveal, recourse to even
the rudimentary principles of contract law offers analytical tools
with which to parse the facts presented in circumstances such as
these and so help a court to assess whether the alleged discrimina-
tory behavior was a matter of contract formation conduct. For in-
luxury car to transport her daughter on the daughter's wedding day. Harvey v. NYRAC, Inc.,
813 F. Supp. 206, 206-07 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). However, the reservation was refused on the day of
the wedding. Id. at 208. The court held that no contract had been entered and, therefore, the
§ 1981 claim centered on a refusal to contract. Id. at 209 n.4.
53. Roberts v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1527, 1528 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
54. The court noted:
After Patterson the resolution of this civil rights claim turns on an interpretation of
the Missouri Commercial Code to determine whether the contract was formed at the
time the alleged violation occurred. The Court does not possess enough information
about the retail transaction to ascertain whether a contract was already formed at the
time defendant recorded the race of plaintiffs on the check.
Id. at 1529.
On subsequent consideration, the court dismissed on the merits, finding that the store's cashiers
were required to record the race of all customers paying by check and that the plaintiffs' race had
no impact on the transaction. Roberts v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1086, 1089 (E.D.
Mo. 1991).
55. As one court noted:
Negotiations between a new employer and existing employees of an acquired business
may occur before or after the closing date of sale. Although an employment relation-
ship existed between Carter and defendants immediately after the Sheraton [Hotel]
was sold, defendants had no opportunity to negotiate a contract with Carter until they
gained control over her [reservations] department. . . . Had defendants terminated
Carter due to poor performance, the six-week transition might be analogous to a pro-
bationary period, which is not actionable under § 1981... . [However,] Carter
presents sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the entire six-
week period she worked for defendants was part of the process for formation of a new
employment relationship.
Carter v. O'Hare Hotel Investors, No. 88 C 10713, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2439 (N.D. Ill. May
14, 1990) (citations omitted), on further consideration. 736 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ill. 1989); see
also Brown v. City of New York, 66 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 636, 643 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
25, 1994) (finding that an employer's decision to disqualify plaintiff from provisional employment
of eight months duration, upon completion of standard investigations of plaintiff's qualifications,
was based on a refusal to contract rather than a discharge).
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stance, according to the familiar terms of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts,5 if an offeror is indifferent to the manner or mode of
acceptance, the offeree can accept either by promise or perform-
ance. " Where an offeror admits acceptance by performance, "the
tender or beginning of the invited performance or a tender of a be-
ginning of it is an acceptance by performance. ' 58 Thus, in the ex-
ample favored by treatise writers, where a customer is injured by a
bottle that explodes after the customer has taken it off the grocery
store shelf, a contract between store and customer had already been
formed at the time of injury - the merchant had made an offer
through the stocking of the goods, and the customer had accepted
the offer through the performance of taking the item from the
shelf."9 Under this logic, where a cashier records the race of a pur-
chaser at the time of payment, this occurs subsequent to the forma-
tion of a contract and so does not present a viable § 1981 claim. 0
Similarly, the refusal of a hairdresser to serve a black customer also
appears to arise as a matter of postformation behavior, where a
manager of the store had previously greeted the customer and con-
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979).
57. See id. § 32; cf. U.C.C. § 2-206(1) ("Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the
language or circumstances (a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as invited acceptance
in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances ....").
Of course, the Restatement's analysis is based on modern contract law, rather than on contract
law in 1866, at the time of passage of § 1981. Oddly, the Patterson Court did not address
whether the statute should be interpreted according to contemporary contract standards. Because
this Article proceeds on the basis of an analysis of the internal sufficiency of the interpretive
approach adopted by the Patterson Court, it does not evaluate the propriety of the Court's neglect
of this issue. It should be noted, however, that contrary to the Patterson Court's disregard of the
issue, textualism typically argues that a Court must maintain fidelity to the original meaning of a
legal text. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construc-
tion, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988) (discussing original intent in the context of two case
examples). It would be interesting to speculate whether the differences between a historical and
contemporary understanding of contract law might in a number of cases change the dividing line
between contract formation and post-contract formation behavior. This is another potential com-
plexity in the interpretation of the statute that the Patterson Court does not confront.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 62(1) (1979); see also id. § 45(1) (stating that
where acceptance is invited by performance only, "an option contract is created when the offeree
tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of it").
59. See, e.g., JOHN E. MURRAY. JR.. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 36, at 80 & 80 n.24 (3d ed.
1990) (citing Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1979); Sheeskin v. Giant Food,
Inc., 318 A.2d 874 (Md.App. 1974)); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 3.10, at 210 n.5 (2d ed. 1990) (citing Barker). Murray claims that in the self-service context,
the customer has an option contract to purchase the item: the store's offer of the good is irrevoca-
ble, but the customer retains the ability to return the good to its shelf and so not exercise the
power of acceptance. MURRAY, supra, § 36, at 81.
60. For a discussion of the case which presents this factual scenario, see supra notes 53-54 and
accompanying text.
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firmed the appointment for services.61
It is notable, however, that the courts in both of these cases did
not find the facts to divide so cleanly against coverage by § 1981.61
This raises a larger point: despite the assistance of contract law's
definition of the point of contract formation, judgments about
whether a particular event falls under the protection of § 1981 may
depend on a rather precise and minute factual inquiry, with situa-
tions of rather close factual proximity falling on either side of the
line of coverage. Consider, for example, the facts raised in recent
litigation against the Denny's chain of restaurants." To reduce the
number of African-American clientele, a number of Denny's nation-
wide undertook the various following strategies: they would seat any
white customers first, stall on serving any black customers seated,
ask black customers (and only black customers) to pay before eat-
ing, and even lock them out. In the latter, which was termed a
"blackout," employees would lock the store doors before potential
African-American customers could enter; the employees would tell
these putative customers that the store was closed, only to reopen
the doors after they had left. 4 Most notoriously, one Denny's re-
fused to serve six African-American secret service agents because of
their race.6 5 This past August, Denny's settled the litigation arising
from all these cases at a cost of $54.4 million. 6  How would these
disputes have been treated under § 1981? While it seems apparent
that the "blackouts" were discriminatory refusals to contract and so
unlawful under § 1981, it is difficult to determine where the line
should be drawn in the other factual circumstances presented. Has a
contract between a restaurant and customer been formed once the
customer walks through the restaurant doors, or is the contract
formed later - when the customer is seated? If the former, then a
61. For a discussion of the case which presents this factual scenario, see supra notes 50-52 and
accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Howard Kohn, Service With a Sneer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 6, 1994, at 43. The
facts of the Denny's cases is meant to be suggestive; the litigation apparently did not directly
present § 1981 claims. See id. at 44 (observing that the cases were brought under the public
accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(l)-a(6)).
64. See id.
65. Some twenty-one secret service agents went to the restaurant for breakfast and only the
black agents were not served after placing their orders. See Black Agents Sue Denny's, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 1993, at AIO. The white agents received breakfasts within ten minutes of their
order, and only one breakfast appeared for a black agent, and that after a wait of one hour. Id.
66. See Kohn, supra note 63, at 48.
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refusal to seat African-Americans07 or a requirement that they pay
before ordering would entail postformation conduct and so fall
outside the coverage of § 1981.
The difficulty of these factual complexities in turn raises an even
more significant question: can it make sense that the protections
provided by § 1981 should be available depending on such slight
factual distinctions? Notice one court's response to a case where an
African-American woman receives a verbal contract on a Friday
that she can start as a part-time waitress the following Monday, but
arrives on Monday to discover that she will be employed in the
kitchen only.68 The court concluded that the employer's actions were
not postformation conduct and expanded upon the vagaries of atten-
tion simply to the moment of contract formation:
While technically a contract may have been formed on Friday, June 2, and
strictly speaking any conduct engaged in thereafter was post-formation con-
duct, the particular facts of this case show why the availability of a remedy
under § 1981 should not, in every case, turn on a strict application of a
state law regarding contract formation. While it may be appropriate for the
law of contract formation to play a major, if not decisive, role in the resolu-
tion of § 1981 claims alleging racial harassment or discriminatory dis-
charge, in cases such as here presented, where the alleged discriminatory
conduct occurred prior to or contemporaneously with the commencement of
the employment relationship, the subtleties of contract law with respect to
formation should assume less importance. Surely, it is not within the spirit
of § 1981 or even Patterson that the technicalities of contract formation law
be determinative of the availability of relief under § 1981 in every case."
The point is not whether the court's judgment was correct, or
whether it was an accurate reflection of the Supreme Court's judg-
ment in Patterson. Rather, the lesson is the unwieldiness of the Su-
preme Court's distinction between contract formation and
postformation conduct and "the extremely strained construction that
can arise from an absolutely fixed gaze on the moment of contract
formation. 70 In Jackson, was the employer's behavior on Monday
67. This factual circumstance has been alleged in at least two § 1981 cases. See Jackson v.
Tyler's Dad's Place, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1994) (presenting claim of denial of seating,
decided on the merits for defendant); Brooks v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 92-1333, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14046 (E.D. La. Sept. 14, 1992) (presenting claim of denial of seating and holding that
African American patrons failed to state a claim under § 1981 by making only "conclusory alle-
gations" of discrimination). Because both courts ruled on the merits, they did not determine
whether the facts presented a discriminatory refusal to contract or a breach of contract.
68. Jackson v. McCleod, 748 F. Supp. 831, 832-33 (S.D. Ala. 1990).
69. Id. at 835.
70. Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1990) (Boggs, J.,
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evidence of discriminatory animus the previous Friday, the time of
the original hire, or did the employer change her mind, for discrimi-
natory reasons, over the weekend? Is it not nonsensical in this and
the prior cases mentioned that the availability of § 1981 depends on
such minute distinctions?
The judgment that the interpretation of a statute leads to seem-
ingly nonsensical results is not an idle one. In numerous cases the
Supreme Court has rejected apparently plain statutory language
where application of this meaning would lead to absurd results. 1
Further and finally, contract law itself is alert to and has responded
to the kind of difficulties created by the Patterson analysis. If the
Court had been more attentive to the insights of contract law, it
would have realized that contract law denies that the moment of
contract formation is decisive. The Uniform Commercial Code, for
example, acknowledges the potential need to define contract forma-
tion where "the moment of its making is undetermined. ' '1 2 As the
secondary commentaries have suggested, the Code recognizes the
possibility of circumstances contrary to the "orthodox catechism
[that] there is a definite moment in time when a party becomes con-
tractually bound on a promise. ' '73 Explicitly addressing Patterson,
dissenting) (referring to the Perry holding).
71. See. e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 467 (1994) (finding that
the particular language of a statute should not be given its "most natural grammatical reading"
where such an application "would produce results that were not merely odd, but positively ab-
surd"); Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (rejecting
application of a statute's meaning where that meaning "would 'compel an odd result") (quoting
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509 (1989)). Importantly, even more textual-
ist justices such as Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia agree that it is appropriate for the Court to
reject a seemingly literal construction of a statute where that construction would lead to absurd
consequences. See, e.g.. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging
that there is no need to apply the language of the statute if it "would lead to 'patently absurd
consequences,' . . . that 'Congress could not possibly have intended,' ") (citations omitted); Bock
Laundry, 490 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (proposing to "verify that what
seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of, and thus to justify a depar-
ture from the ordinary meaning of the word"). Disagreement among members of the Court rests
not on the propriety of the general principle, but on how broadly or narrow it should be drawn.
See, e.g., Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 470-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the principle
should be applied only where the consequences "would be, in a genuine sense, absurd, i.e., where
it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result, ... and where the alleged
absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone").
72. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (1979).
73. FARNSWORTH, supra note 59, § 3.2, at 161; see also 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE Series § 2-204:02, at 110 (1993) ("If the parties have, in fact, come to an
agreement as to the sales transaction, a contract is formed, even though an offer or acceptance
cannot be isolated, or the moment the contract was made cannot be determined."). The U.C.C.
provides that an affirmation by a seller to a buyer becomes an element of "the basis of the bar-
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Steven Burton maintains that the Supreme Court could have
avoided the consequences of its interpretation of § 1981 if it had
understood that contract law rejects the Court's basic distinction be-
tween contract formation and post-contract formation.
These final observations take us beyond the terms of the Court's
analysis. They also go further than the boundaries more generally
assumed in this Article, which pursues the logic of the Court's anal-
ysis on its own grounds. As the cases reveal even on these more
narrow terms, however, in evaluating refusal to hire claims, a cause
of action that clearly remains vital after Patterson, the lower courts
have faced significant difficulties in applying what the Court
thought was rather plain meaning, and that meaning has expanded
in unforeseen ways upon its application.
III. PROMOTION CLAIMS
The viability of § 1981 promotion cases remains one of the most
vexing areas for courts post-Patterson.5 While promotion claims
gain" and thus an express warranty, U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (a) (1978), and it is immaterial that the
precise moment of the affirmation may occur after the main contractual agreement has been
struck. Id. at § 2-313, Comment 7. "The sole question is whether the language ... [is] fairly to
be regarded as part of the contract." Id.; see also MURRAY, supra note 59, § 100, at 545 (arguing
that the authors of § 2-313 "were pursuing a bargain continuum which is a bargaining process
extending beyond the moment in time when the contract of sale was made."). From the rather
different perspective of Critical Legal Studies, Mark Kelman offers a more extended critique of
the ability to determine the moment a contract is formed. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 18-19 (1987).
74. Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and a State
Law Alternative, 25 HARV. J. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 445 (1990). Burton stated:
Far from isolating formation, performance, and enforcement from each other, the
modern law of contracts treats the stages of contract as interdependent and mutually
supporting parts of a coherent social practice. In this light, "the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts" is not an independent statutory phrase to be bifurcated
into two separate rights, with contract performance dropping out. The phrase is a
singular reference to the legal power of contract, encompassing all stages of a
contract.
Id.; see also STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 83-84 (discussing Patterson and noting
that "[t]he performance stage of a contract cannot be excised from the 'right . . . to make and
enforce contracts' within a coherent understanding of the modern law of contracts"). As for his
reference to modern contract law, Burton maintains that § 1981 should be interpreted according
to contemporary notions of contract in order to "coordinate[] the statute with the law that actu-
ally governs the relevant transactions and relations as a practical matter." Burton, supra, at 447.
As noted previously, the Court itself made no assessment of whether its interpretation of § 1981
accords with the original, rather than a contemporary, meaning of the statutory terms. See supra
note 57.
75. See infra notes 106-54 and accompanying text (discussing lower court applications of the
Patterson decision).
1995] TEXTUALISM AT WORK
fall under § 1981's right to make a contract, they present a diffi-
culty under the Court's analysis because promotion claims do not
neatly follow the Court's division between formation conduct -
which, as we have seen, remains actionable - and postformation
conduct - which does not. 6 Promotion is at once a postformation
activity, and yet at the same time arguably the formation of a new
contract. This split character of promotion claims under Patterson
has caused some courts to treat these claims as an "exception" to
the formation- postformation division."
A. The Patterson Court's Ruling
Although it has not yet been generally recognized, the Court's
evaluation of promotion claims must be understood as functioning
not as an exception to but as entirely congruent with the remainder
of its analysis of the § 1981 right to make a contract. A careful
structural analysis of the Court's opinion establishes this insight. In
section III (A) of the opinion, the Court explicated the meaning of
76. In the words of the Seventh Circuit, these claims "straddle the line" between formation and
postformation conduct. Partee v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist., 954 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1992).
77. See, e.g., Berry v. General Motors Corp., 796 F. Supp. 1409, 1426 (D. Kan. 1992) ("The
Patterson decision . . . provided an exception for promotion claims."); Holt v. Michigan Dept. of
Corrections, 771 F. Supp. 201, 204 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that the Patterson court intended
"to limit the 'failure to promote' exception to those situations involving a fundamental and distinct
change in the contractual relationship between the employer and the employee. ) affd, 974
F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1641 (1994); White v. Federal Express Corp.,
729 F. Supp. 1536, 1544 (E.D. Va. 1990) ("With [the] single exception [of promotion claims,]
Patterson draws a bright line distinction between pre-contract formation conduct . . . and post-
contract formation conduct."), affd, 939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that Patterson "carved out a narrow
exception with respect to failure to promote claims of discrimination.").
Worse are cases that do not recognize that promotion claims even present a challenge to the
formation- post-formation division. See, e.g., Espinueva v. Garrett, 895 F.2d 1164, 1165 (7th Cir.
1990) ("Section 1981 does not apply to employment discrimination cases involving the federal
government and would not authorize damages on account of failure to promote even if it did
§ 1981 'covers only conduct at the initial formation of the contract and conduct which im-
pairs the right to enforce contract obligations through legal process'.") (quoting Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1989)); Washington v. Court of Common Pleas, 845 F.
Supp. 1107, 1108 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that "failure to promote claims are not cognizable
under § 1981"); Maddox v. Norwood Clinic, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 582, 582-83 (N.D. Ala. 1992)
("At the time this action was filed, Title VII proscribed the alleged misconduct [failure to pro-
mote] of defendant but Section 1981 did not. Section 1981 made unlawful racial discrimination
only in the formation of contracts."); Butts v. City of New York, Dept. of Hous. Preservation &
Dev., No. 91 Civ. 5325 (LJF), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 998, at 012 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1992)
(dismissing promotion claim on the basis that Patterson "held that an employee has no claim for
employment discrimination under § 1981 unless the acts complained of related to the making or
enforcement of a contract."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1993).
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§ 1981's right to make and enforce contracts.78 In section III (B),
the Court applied these principles to Brenda Patterson's racial har-
assment claim.7 9 Section IV in turn applied the Court's prior inter-
pretation of § 1981 to Patterson's promotion claim:
Consistent with what we have said in Part III, supra, the question whether
a promotion claim is actionable under § 1981 depends upon whether the
nature of the change in position was such that it involved the opportunity to
enter into a new contract with the employer. If so, then the employer's re-
fusal to enter the new contract is actionable under § 1981.60
The remainder of the Court's analysis is extremely brief. The Court
used only one sentence to insist that courts making a determination
of the viability of a promotion claim should "give a fair and natural
reading to" and "not strain in an undue manner" the language of
§ 1981.81 Then, in the course of one additional sentence and one
citation, the Court provided its only substantive clue as to what, in
its view, would constitute a viable § 1981 promotion claim:
Only where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and
distinct relation between the employee and the employer is such a claim
actionable under § 1981. Cf. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69
(1984) (refusal of law firm to accept associate into partnership) (Title
VII)."
The Court went no further in assessing the validity of Patterson's
promotion claim under § 1981 and later remanded the issue to the
lower courts.83
In my view, the Court's substantive application to promotion
claims of what it means to "make" a contract under § 1981 is the
critical moment in its entire analysis. The Court's textual analysis in
Patterson rises or falls on the basis of its accomplishment here. Not
only do the lower courts have difficulty applying the meaning of
Patterson to promotion cases, but also the Court does itself. The
Court's weak effort to apply to promotion claims the meaning it dis-
cerns in § 1981 demonstrates how tenuous is the textualist meaning
78. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176-78.
79. Id. at 178-82. "Applying these principles to the case before us, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that petitioner's racial harassment claim is not actionable under § 1981." Id. at 178
(emphasis added). Section III(C) of the case responds to interpretations of § 1981 by Justice
Brennan and the Solicitor General and is irrelevant to the present discussion. Id. at 182-85.
80. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 185-86.
83. Id. at 189. The remainder of Section IV discusses a subject not relevant for our purposes,
the jury instructions on Patterson's promotion claim. Id. at 186-88.
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drawn. The fundamental frailty in the Court's analysis becomes evi-
dent because the soft footing cannot bear the weight of analysis
built upon it.84 Examination of lower court promotion cases only
confirms the difficulty the Court's analysis presents.
Before turning to these cases, several points about the Court's
analysis warrant emphasis. First, as previously observed, the Patter-
son opinion's discussion of promotion claims clarifies that these
claims are not an exception to the Court's determination of the
meaning of § 1981 but an application of this meaning. 5 Second,
the Court could have largely avoided the problem of promotion
claims by simply declaring that § 1981's protection of "the same
right . . . to make . . . contracts" extended only to entirely new
contracts, that is, contracts at the moment of original hire. 6 All
other employment contracts could then have been interpreted as re-
newals or modifications of prior contracts and, therefore, as the "re-
making" of an existing contract rather than the making of an initial
contract. Alternatively, the Court could have expanded the meaning
going beyond moment of entry and still limited when a "contract" is
formally made by looking to such evidence as memorialization or
detailed negotiation of terms. These distinctions would have permit-
ted the maintenance of a bright-line - or at least a much brighter
line - between formation and postformation conduct.8 Despite
these possibilities of a more bright-line rule, the Court did not find
such rules to make sense of the statute.88 If these interpretations of
§ 1981 seem an artifice, though, the question remains whether the
Court's actual test is any less so.
84. As I shall subsequently argue, the Court's analysis here informs assessment not only of
promotion claims but also demotion, transfer, and discriminatory discharge claims. See infra notes
155-249 and accompanying text.
85. Reiterating the statement by the Court, the district court on subsequent remand said that
the Patterson Court developed principles differentiating formation and postformation conduct and
"also developed a special rule, consistent with the rules stated above, regarding discriminatory
promotion practices." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 784 F. Supp. 268, 281 (M.D.N.C.
1992) (emphasis added), aff'd, 39 F.3d 515 (4th Cir. 1994).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). I use the example of employment, although it should be noted
that § 1981 is not so limited.
87. Cf Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1317-18 (7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J., concur-
ring) (noting the potential lack of symmetry in promotion claims depending on whether the ag-
grieved is a new or a current employee, but remarking that "I do not see how that condition, an
accident of history or of political will, permits us to revise the scheme. If making statutes logical
or symmetrical was the judicial task, we would be a law revision commission, not a court").
88. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989) (holding a § 1981 promotion
claim viable where it gives rise "to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation
between the employee and employer").
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In any event, the Court did not hesitate to say that at least some
promotions are actionable under § 1981 if they do "involve[] the
opportunity to enter into a new contract with the employer."89 It
also defined the statutory phrase "make . . . contracts" to include
as actionable new formal contracts as well as new contractual rela-
tions.90 The test is a functional, not formal, one. What is function-
ally a new contractual relation may exist within what is formally the
same contract as before; at a time when the formal contract does
not change, the contractual relationship may.
In its Patterson opinion, the Court did not register an awareness
that application of § 1981's meaning to promotion claims would be
in any way problematic." Building on its prior statement that it
thought lower courts would have "little difficulty applying the
straightforward principles that we announce today," '92 the Court
seemed to believe that its own application of these principles to pro-
motion claims was, as we have seen, simply "consistent with" these
principles." The moment of application was not worthy of much in-
dependent inquiry evidently because it merely involved derivation
from prior standards already enunciated. The Court did not recog-
nize that locating promotion claims on either side of the divide be-
tween formation or postformation conduct might present intractable
difficulties. Hence, the Court also did not recognize that application
to promotion claims of the meaning it held § 1981 to have would
require extension, clarification, and reformulation of this meaning.
The Court's attempt to move rather seamlessly from meaning to
application is belied, however, not only by later cases in the lower
courts but also by what follows in its own discussion. After insisting
on the congruity of promotion claims with prior principles interpret-
ing the making of a contract, the Court issued a directive. In mak-
ing a determination about the viability of a promotion claim,
89. Id.
90. Id. ("Only where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct
relation between the employee and the employer is such a claim actionable under § 1981.") (em-
phasis added).
91. It is also interesting that the viability of promotion claims under § 1981 received little
discussion in oral argument. And about the only time the subject was discussed, respondent Mc-
Lean Credit Union argued simply that if hostile work conditions influenced a promotion decision,
then an employee had a viable claim. Oral Argument of Respondent at 24, Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (No. 87-107) (Feb. 29, 1988).
92. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185 n.6. This footnote appears at the very end of Section III and
immediately prior to the Court's discussion of promotion claims that begins Section IV.
93. Id. at 185.
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a lower court should give a fair and natural reading to the statutory phrase
"the same right . . . to make . . . contracts," and should not strain in an
undue manner the language of § 1981. Only where the promotion rises to
the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the em-
ployee and the employer is such a claim actionable under § 1981."
On the one hand, this statement can be read as the Court's empha-
sis that interpretation should remain textualist - lower courts must
derive meaning from what the text says rather than impose meaning
upon it. Under this view, the "new and distinct relation" test simply
represents the proper textualist reading of the statute. Yet consider
the difference between the statutory language - "right . . . to
make . . . contracts" - and the "new and distinct relation" re-
quirement. Why does the making of contracts require that the rela-
tion be "new and distinct?" The statutory text does not directly
point to this requirement. It is rather the Court's own creation
which it then imposed on the statute -the exact activity the Court
directs lower courts to abjure. 95 Moreover, cannot a textualist inter-
pretation of § 1981 apply the statute to promotions in ways quite
divergent from the Supreme Court's? The Fourth Circuit Patterson
decision, for example, found no need to distinguish among kinds of
promotion claims and held rather that "[c]laims of racially discrimi-
natory . . . promotion . . . fall easily within § 1981's protection. "96
Viewed more critically, it seems that the Court's "new and dis-
tinct relation" test determines rather than reflects what is "a fair
and natural reading" 97 of the statutory text. The Court decided the
94. Id.
95. A number of commentators have had difficulty locating the basis for this language. See,
e.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d F.2d 1305, 1317 n.6 (7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., con-
curring) (stating that "although the Patterson decision is replete with contract terminology of
established meaning ('pre-' and 'post-formation conduct,' 'breach,' 'performance,' etc.), the term
'new and distinct relation' nowhere appears in the generally accepted contracts jurisprudence"); 1
Joint House Hearings, supra note 25, at 184 (prepared statement of Julius Chambers, Director-
Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund) ("This 'new and distinct relation' [test]
was entirely a novel concept in the law .... "); Marc J. Fagel, Comment, Section 1981 Promo-
tion Claims After Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 921 (1990) ("As
should be evident, the 'new and distinct relation' test has no explicit foundation."). But see Byrd v.
Pyle, 728 F. Supp. 1, 1 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Although this language [of 'new and distinct relation'] is
essentially dictum, the principle it states follows inexorably from the Court's core holding.").
96. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986). For elaboration
of the theory behind this holding as an alternative textualist approach, see infra notes 202-07 and
accompanying text. The Supreme Court responded directly to the Fourth Circuit's judgment, first
quoting the lower court and then responding, "We think that somewhat overstates the case."
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185.
97. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185.
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implications of the statutory language, and this interpretation is
stamped with the imprimatur of being "fair and natural." 98 The
lower courts are then told not to "strain in an undue manner the
language of § 1981,""9 where the notion of "strain" is a question of
the extent of deviance from the Court's test. 100 But again, although
the Court did not acknowledge this, other interpretations of the stat-
utory language are at least equally plausible. The issue is whether
the statutory text permits implication of the right to make a con-
tract in circumstances more modest than creation of a "new and
distinct" contractual relation.
The question raised, then, is whether the Court's "new and dis-
tinct relation" test is not so much an independent reading of the
statutory language as one designed to restrict the application that
the text otherwise permits. Without the Court's gloss on the text,
application of the statute's meaning to promotion cases would not be
as straightforward as the Court seemed to intend. More precisely,
the barrier between formation conduct and postformation conduct
would break down. 101 The Court may have asserted it was simply
trying to make the best sense of the statute, but Justice Stevens'
dissent claimed no less.102 Recall that the textualist goal is to derive
the statute's meaning from the text itself - adhere to what Con-
gress has wrought - rather than to impose on the language Con-
gress has written what the Court views as the best sense, rule, or
purpose.10 8 The Court's very insistence that lower courts give the
text a fair reading - an emphasis not present in its original discus-
sion of what it means under § 1981 to make and enforce a con-
98. The threat is that the Court becomes like Lewis Carroll's oft-cited Humpty Dumpty, an
entity that decides on its own what the meaning of words will be. LEWIs CARROLL, THROUGH THE
LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 124-25 (1993).
99. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185.
100. See, e.g., Wall v. Trust Co. of Ga., 946 F.2d 805, 808 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Effectively,
Patterson held that in the promotion context, a new contract is not made for purposes of section
1981 unless such a new and distinct relationship would flow from the promotion.").
101. This breakdown was evident in Justice Stevens' dissent:
Whenever significant new duties are assigned to the employee - whether they better
or worsen the relationship - the contract is amended and a new contract is made.
Thus, if after the employment relationship is formed, the employer deliberately imple-
ments a policy of harassment of black employees, it has imposed a contractual term
on them that is not the "same" as the contractual provisions that are "enjoyed by
white citizens."
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 219-20 (interpreting'§ 1981).
103. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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tract '0 - seems an attempt to discipline courts into reading the
text more with an eye to the Court's own interpretation rather than
to primary attention to the statutory language itself.10 5 Under the
"new and distinct relation" test, the language of the text recedes
from view, and the lower courts' obligation is to attend to and deci-
pher what the Court intended by this test. Under this view, then, the
Court has not simply explicated the text of § 1981 but has inter-
posed itself and its decisions between the lower courts and the text.
B. Lower Court Applications as Textualist?
Suppose, though, that we bracket any criticism of the Court's own
movement here from meaning to application and consider simply the
lower courts' application of the "new and distinct relation" test. If
the Court's interpretation of what it means to make a contract in
the promotion context aims to provide further guidance on what is a
viable promotion claim, then how well does this more delimited
sense of the meaning of the text assist the lower courts' application
of § 1981? Those courts have commented specifically on the gap
between the Court's enunciated rule and its application. The Sev-
enth Circuit, for instance, has remarked:
As this court has noted on several occasions, the "new and distinct relation"
standard is difficult to apply. Partee v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist, 954 F.2d
454,457 (7th Cir. January 21, 1992) (acknowledging that this court has
"expressed some uncertainty as to the precise meaning of Patterson's 'new
and distinct relation' test"); McKnight [v. General Motors Corp.], 908 F.2d
[104,] 109-10 [7th Cir. (1990)] (noting that "the question of what consti-
tutes a new employment relation under Patterson is difficult and unset-
tled"); Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989)
("We show no disrespect to the Supreme Court by suggesting that the scope
of Patterson is uncertain."). Indeed, we have remarked that there is no sim-
ple, bright-line test to apply. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 109 ("Precisely how
different the new employment relation must be to make a racially motivated
refusal to create it actionable under section 1981 is not susceptible of a
blanket answer . . ,,).106
A district court questioned "whether any bright line formulas can
be uniformly applied as a matter of law to the plethora of promotion
104. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176-78.
105. This is not to say that any court can read a statute independent of external context. See
generally Taylor, Structural Textualism, supra note 5.
106. Taylor v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1200 (7th Cir. 1992); accord Von
Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1473 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Partee and
McKnight).
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decisions that are made every day in the labor force. ' 1°"1 A Sixth
Circuit review of post-Patterson promotion cases revealed that
"courts have had to undertake subtle, sometimes hairsplitting analy-
ses to determine whether a change in employment constitutes a 'new
and distinct relation.' "108 While the Patterson Court's explicit ref-
erence to the Hishon'0 9 case - which involved the failure to pro-
mote a law associate to partner - may be intended as a paradigm
of a "new and distinct relation," the Second Circuit stated that it
"does not assist . . . in defining the border between actionable and
non-actionable promotions under § 1981.""°
Admittedly, application of the Court's standard has not been as
inchoate as these judicial observations suggest. For example, after
its statement quoted above,11 the Seventh Circuit noted that "de-
spite the absence of a definitive framework, a substantial body of
law has developed among the circuits to provide adequate guide-
posts. ' 112 Before evaluating this body of law, however, we must rec-
ognize that its development may have occurred in at least three dif-
ferent ways, only one of which maintains fidelity to textualism.
First, from a textualist perspective, it would appear that the "new
and distinct relation" test should be understood as akin to the
Court's clarification of a word's or phrase's definition. The meaning
of the word or phrase seems ambiguous, and through closer scrutiny
of the statute's language and structure, the Court resolves the ap-
parent tension. The clarification either provides needed rigor to the
disputed word or phrase or, as in Patterson, serves as substitute lan-
guage for the contested terms. Once the meaning of the text is de-
fined, then application of this language to a particular case proceeds
by a process of derivation, according to the logic of the statute itself.
107. Dash v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 753 F. Supp. 1062, 1068 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); see
also Duse v. IBM Corp., 748 F. Supp. 956, 964-65 (D. Conn. 1990) (stating that "the line divid-
ing promotions that continue to be actionable under § 1981 and those that do not is hardly one
that is precisely drawn"); Zaidi v. Block Drug Co., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964, 965
(D.N.J. Apr. 18, 1990) ("It is not surprising that lower federal courts are struggling to discern a
workable definition of 'new and distinct relation.' ").
108. Holt v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 974 F.2d 771, 774 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994); accord Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc., 997 F.2d 793,
801 (10th Cir. 1993) (describing the courts as having engaged "in subtle hairsplitting analyses").
109. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185-86 (1989) (citing Hishon v. King
& Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
110. Butts v. City of New York, Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1411 (2d
Cir. 1993).
111. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
112. Taylor v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1200 (7th Cir. 1992).
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By contrast, according to a second alternative, judicial attention is
no longer directed toward a supposed unfolding of the text's intrin-
sic logic but to the Court's own resolution of the statutory inquiry.
Under one variant of this model, attention is turned from the
Court's elucidation of the statutory text to the Court's own develop-
ment of doctrine.113 Under another variant, just as under Chevron" 4
a court would defer in a situation of statutory ambiguity to a rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute by a governing agency, here a
lower court would defer to the Supreme Court's resolution of ambig-
uous statutory language. Whatever the variant, focus is no longer on
the language of the statute but on the logic and intent of the Court's
judgment.
A third alternative finds only the broadest implications deducible
from either the statute or the Court's judgment. Under this ap-
proach, interpretation proceeds in the lower courts in a fashion more
akin to a common law development - application and development
of a principle worked out in varied circumstances over time." 5
Examination of the post-Patterson promotion cases reveal that
they basically fall within the second and third alternatives. Under
the second alternative, a number of courts have emphasized the in-
tent lying behind the Court's introduction of the "new and distinct
relation" test. One court observed, for example, that it cannot be
enough under this test for a promotion to involve merely increased
responsibilities and pay, because "were such a showing sufficient to
survive Patterson, the Court's comments would be effectively evis-
cerated."" 6 Another court agreed that different duties and pay do
113. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 25-58
(1982) (distinguishing textual argument from doctrinal argument); Robert Post, Theories of Con-
stitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 13, 31 (Robert Post ed., 1991)
("Doctrinal interpretation ... applies not the words of the document, but legal rules that judges
have subsequently created.").
114. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
115. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, was intended to create a body
of federal common law).
116. Byrd v. Pyle, 728 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1989). One commentator has noted similarly:
[I]t is difficult to develop a satisfactory definition of "new and distinct relation" by
drawing solely on contract law principles.. . . Whether one looks for an exchange of
consideration, or for a modification sufficient to stand apart from the original con-
tract, it is evident that any conceivable promotion may arguably reach the level of a
"new and distinct" contract cognizable under § 1981. This result was clearly not in-
tended by the Patterson Court.
Fagel, Comment, supra note 95, at 921.
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not in themselves suffice for a promotion claim because "Patterson
clearly did not intend every such claim to be actionable under Sec-
tion 1981.117 A third court rejected the availability of a standard
emphasizing simply some quantitative differences in pay or function,
because "we do not believe that the Supreme Court had a quantita-
tive standard in mind when it spoke of a 'new and distinct relation
between the employee and the employer.' "118 Other courts have
cited the Court's reference to Hishon as evidence that the Court
intended the "new and distinct relation" test to be limited only to
fundamental changes in the contractual relationship. 1 9 These refer-
ences may suggest that when the Patterson Court admonished the
lower courts to adhere to "a fair and natural reading" of the stat-
ute, 2 ' this requirement is satisfied in actuality more by attention to
the Court's own views of the statute rather than to what is inelucta-
bly entailed by the statute itself.1 "1
A number of courts also fall within the third alternative and have
concentrated on the definition of a "new and distinct relation" as it
has evolved through the case law. In these cases, attention has been
focused less on the statute or on the Patterson Court's intentions,
neither of which provides definitive guidance, than on the judgments
that have developed in the case-by-case application of Patterson
over time. To quote the Seventh Circuit again, with somewhat dif-
ferent emphasis, the sense promoted is that "despite the absence of
a definitive framework [provided by the Supreme Court], a substan-
tial body of law has developed among the circuits to provide ade-
117. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., No. 86 C 9460, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16653 (N.D. II1. Dec.
4, 1990), affd, 963 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1992).
118. Sitgraves v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 953 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1992).
119. See, e.g., Conerly v. CVN Cos., 785 F. Supp. 801, 809 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding that the
reference to Hishon by the Patterson Court suggested that the "failure to promote" exception is
limited to those situations involving a fundamental and distinct change in the contractual relation-
ship) (citing Holt v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 771 F. Supp. 201, 204 (W.D. Mich. 1991));
Guliford v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 768 F. Supp. 313, 320 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting the Hishon
court's intention to apply § 1981 only to "promotions involving a fundamental change"); Sofferin
v. American Airlines, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. I11. 1989) (citing Hishon to require a
"true 'change' in position"); Byrd v. Pyle, 728 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1989) (citing Hishon as
suggesting a "fundamental change is necessary").
120. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989).
121. But see Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1318 (7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J.,
concurring) ("Here, we ought to be particularly circumspect because the Supreme Court has
warned us rather pointedly that we are to apply Patterson, not undermine it. When dealing with
this very issue [of promotion claims], the Supreme Court specifically warned us to give "a fair and
natural reading to the statutory phrase 'the same right . . . to make . . . contracts.'" ).
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quate guideposts."122 Another court observed that "[n]umerous
courts have offered factors to guide in assessing the existence of a
cognizable [promotion] claim under § 1981 ....
C. The Lower Courts' Tests
Suppose, though, we set aside the fact that the lower courts may
be applying Patterson more on the basis of either developing case
law or the Court's intent and assume for the sake of argument that
the task is to apply the "new and distinct relation" test according to
a textualist methodology. Does the Court's test afford courts the
ability to derive criteria uniformly applicable in concrete cases? Be-
cause, according to the Court, the statute only prohibits racial dis-
crimination in the making of contracts, the interpretive goal is to
establish standards that prevent nonactionable racial harassment or
discriminatory conditions claims from transforming themselves into
viable promotion claims.1 24 The task is then to decipher when a
change in working conditions should be actionable. Virtually no
court has disputed that changes such as routine pay raises are not
actionable. 126 After that point, as previously discussed,1 "  issues be-
122. Taylor v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1200 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added). An earlier decision noted to similarly relevant effect: "The parameters of the 'new and
distinct relation' test are still being defined by the federal courts." Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank,
Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added).
123. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 784 F. Supp. 268, 284 (M.D.N.C. 1992) (emphasis
added), affd, 39 F.3d 515 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Sitgraves v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 953 F.2d 570,
573 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The circuit courts' decisions since Patterson sensibly suggest. ... ); Guz-
man v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 998 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 1990) ("The developing
body of case law has identified several significant changes. ... ); Hudgens v. Harper-Grace
Hosp., 728 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (E.D. Mich. 1990) ("Other district courts considering [the failure
to promote claims] have found facts sufficient to support a new and distinct relationship."); Wil-
liams v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Although no bright
line test has emerged [in the lower courts] to determine whether a promotion alone constitutes a
'new and distinct relation,' several Courts have proposed factors to guide in this assessment
As the reference to Sitgraves here suggests, some cases fall within both the second and third
alternatives. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (citing Sitgraves within the second
alternative).
124. See, e.g., Patterson, 784 F. Supp. at 283 (holding that minor differences between positions
do not give rise to new contracts else "virtually all requests for changes in job assignments would
be swept back within the ambit of § 1981, a result at odds with the thrust of Patterson") (citing
White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1546 (E.D. Va. 1990)).
125. See, e.g., Williams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 716 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D.D.C. 1989)
("Higher pay is a part of nearly all promotions and by itself can hardly make a promotion a 'new
and distinct relation.' ") (citation omitted), affd, 901 F.2d 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1990). But see Fowler
v. McCrory Corp., 727 F. Supp. 228, 230 n.l (D. Md. 1989) ("Presumably . . . any promotion
which would involve a concrete change in the terms of employment (such as salary or benefits)
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come much more murky.
At one extreme are cases that have held that the promotion must
be comparable to that at issue in Hishon27 - from law firm associ-
ate to partner, a change from employee to owner status. Either a
new contract of employment or the functional equivalent must be
formed; there must be a fundamental change in the nature of the
employment relationship:"2 8 Here, for example, the failure of an em-
ployee to be promoted from account administrator to manager
would not be actionable, as the difference between management and
non-management positions differed "only in responsibility and com-
pensation," and in either job, the employee would have remained in
the status of employee and would have been governed by the same
employment handbook.129
More common is a test that does not demand that the promotion
effect a fundamental change but rather a substantial one. This is
the test toward which most courts seem to be coalescing over time.
In an early assessment a circuit judge contended the standard
should be whether the promotion is the equivalent of a "new job,"
something requiring "a substantial change in the plaintiff's duties
and responsibilities.""' But some more recent decisions have em-
phasized that the change must be "qualitative.""' More generally,
would be covered by § 1981.") (dictum).
126. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
127. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
128. See, e.g., James v. IBM Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1420, 1525 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (adopting this
test); Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (identifying the
test as "whether the promotion would change the terms of the contractual relationship between
the employee and the employer"); Waller v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 767 F. Supp. 1548,
1557 (D. Kan. 1991) (adopting the test that "the basic terms of the contractual relationship
between the employer and employee must be so affected as to necessitate or create a new con-
tract"); Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (identifying
the test as whether "the promotion sought would actually entail a new contract or otherwise dra-
matically alter the past structure of the employer/employee relationship").
129. James, 737 F. Supp. at 1425; see also Jenkins v. Ward, 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1839, 1843 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1990) ("If plaintiff were promoted [from police officer] to police
sergeant, he would not have entered into a new contractual relationship, since the New York City
Police Department will still remain his employer.").
130. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1317 n.6 (7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).
131. Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc., 997 F.2d 793, 802 (10th Cir. 1993);
Taylor v. Western and S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1200-01 (7th Cir. 1992); Sitgraves v.
Allied-Signal, Inc., 953 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1992). The emphasis on a qualitative change also
responds to objections of the earlier test requiring only substantial change. See, e.g., White v.
Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1545-46 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding that the latter
might erroneously permit the viability of transfer claims), aff'd, 939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); see
infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text (discussing transfer claims).
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the standard has been described as fact specific and encompassing,
looking not only at changes in pay, duties, and responsibilities, but
changes in responsibility level, in pay status from hourly wage to
salary, job qualifications, status within the organization, move from
nonsupervisory to supervisory role, pension and other benefits, and
so on.182 This test does not provide bright-line demarcations18" and
demands that a court "exercise reasoned judgment as to whether
that change will work a new and distinct relation between the par-
ties. This judgment must consider not only the number of resulting
changes, but the magnitude of individual changes, and of the
changes as a whole. 1 84 Under this kind of test, Brenda Patterson's
claim that she was discriminatorily not promoted from bank teller to
Account Intermediate did not survive, since in both positions she
would remain in the same office, receive hourly wages, have the
same supervisor, little increase in pay, a modest change in tasks, and
no change in her level of responsibility.1 8 5
As a result of this functional test, courts have held that "routine"
advancement, advancement that is an outgrowth of or expectation
deriving from the original employment contract, does not present a
viable § 1981 claim.18 6 Courts have also held nonactionable promo-
tions that are a necessary but prior step to subsequent promotions
that would give rise to a new employment relation.1 87
132. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 39 F.3d 515, 519 (1994); Guzman v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 998 n.4 (W.D. Tex. 1990); DeBailey v. Lynch-Davidson
Motors, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 974, 977 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (quoting Brown v. American Food Serv.
Corp., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 706, 707 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1990)); Hudgens v. Harper-
Grace Hosps., 728 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
133. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
134. Guzman, 756 F. Supp. at 998 n.4.
135. Patterson, 39 F.3d at 519.
136. See, e.g., Butts v. City of New York, Dept. of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397,
1411 (2d Cir. 1993) ("With respect to promotions, the inquiry is whether a promotion effectively
creates a new contract between employer and employee or is simply the fulfillment of a stated
promise or an implicit expectation in the original contract."); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965
F.2d 1363, 1370-72 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing cases) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994); Waller v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp. 767 F. Supp. 1548, 1558 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding promotion was
part of ordinary employee progression); Dash v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 753 F. Supp.
1062, 1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (ruling that the issue is whether a promotion is "a natural outgrowth
of the original terms and conditions of employment"); Watson v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 742 F.
Supp. 353, 355 (M.D. La. 1990) (holding promotion was "routine advancement").
137. See, e.g., Harris v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., No. 88-4271-R, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14140, at *9 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1991), affd, 963 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1992); Malhotra v.
Cotter & Co., No. 86 C 9460, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16653 (N.D. I1. Dec. 4, 1990). An excep-
tion may be if the prospect of the future promotion is not speculative but an element of the
position being sought. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 784 F. Supp. 268, 285
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This test has also led to a number of continuing disputes, some-
times within the same circuit. For example, the Ninth Circuit and a
decision in the Seventh Circuit have held that the move from nonsu-
pervisory to supervisory status is in itself sufficient to form an ac-
tionable promotion claim, whereas the Fifth Circuit and two other
cases from the Seventh Circuit have held that it is not.188 Other
cases divide on whether a promotion from one supervisory position
to another is actionable.13 9
Particularly striking is the judicial division as to whether various
kinds of generally blue-collar promotions are actionable. Cases here
include promotions from probationary to regular employee or from
part-time to full-time employment. The majority of decisions appear
to find these cases not actionable, generally because the promotions
involve no or little change in the employee's duties and responsibili-
ties.1 40 This result slights the rights and status generally granted
(M.D.N.C. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff did not produce any support to show that the new
position was a prerequisite to movement up the company ladder thereby making such movement
an element of a new contractual relationship), afl'd, 39 F.3d 515 (4th Cir. 1994); Saunders v.
George Washington Univ., 768 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D.D.C. 1991) (finding that promotion to ten-
ure-track position will, at this school, almost inevitably lead to tenure and holding that grant of
tenure is a new and distinct employment relationship). Ironically, then, if the promotion is an
outgrowth of the original contract it may not be considered a new and distinct relation. See supra
note 136 and accompanying text (citing cases which held that promotions are considered part of
the existing relation). However, if the promotion is an outgrowth of a subsequent position at-
tained, it may be so considered.
138. Compare Sitgraves v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 953 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
promotion claim viable) and Taylor v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1200 (7th Cir.
1992) with Johnson, 965 F.2d at 1371 (holding promotion claim not viable) and Partee v. Metro.
Sch. Dist., 954 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1992) and Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co.,
940 F.2d 1036, 1054-55 (7th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 644 (1993).
139. Compare Holt v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 974 F.2d 771, 774-75 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding promotion not actionable), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994) and Williams v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 728 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) with Payne v. General Motors
Corp., 731 F. Supp. 1465, 1474 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that claim survives summary judgment).
140. See, e.g., Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1119-20 (7th Cir. 1992) (involving
employee who claimed promotion to full-time word processor was deserved as she was already
doing work of full-time employee; court held it would be anomalous to find that this promotion
created a new employment relationship); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1373
(8th Cir. 1992) (holding promotion from part-time to full-time mailroom employee "did not con-
stitute . . . a new and distinct contractual relation"); White v. Union Pacific R.R., 805 F. Supp.
883, 887-88 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that part-time and full-time trackman positions involved the
same hours, benefits, rate of pay, job responsibilities, duties, and same qualifications and, there-
fore, did not create a new employment relationship); Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 717 F.
Supp. 597, 599 (N.D. I11. 1989) (ruling that promotion from probationary to "tenured status" is
not actionable as employee would be performing same job functions), aj'd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part on other grounds, 923 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1991), on remand, 785 F. Supp. 780
(N.D. Il1. 1992); Hannah v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 89-0699, 1990 U.S. Dist.
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regular or full-time employees, 4 1 something recognized in the cases
permitting these promotions to go forward. 142 For additional con-
trast, consider the right given a faculty member to pursue a promo-
tion claim that would move her from yearly contracts to permanent
status because of the grant of tenure.14 8 On the other hand, accord-
ing to at least one court, a promotion from associate to full professor
(where both are tenured positions) may not present a viable § 1981
claim.14 4 Questions of value, stigma, and perception, stated the
Third Circuit, should be discounted; none of these factors "indicate
the creation of a new contract because they do not touch any of the
terms of the contract as to duties, tenure, compensation or essential
function[s]. ' ' " These cases highlight the ambiguity of what it
LEXIS 3586, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1990) (holding driver's promotion to permanent route
not an actionable claim as would entail same job responsibilities); see also Bush v. Commonwealth
Edison, Co., 778 F. Supp. 1436, 1446-47 (N.D. Il1. 1991) (ruling promotion between two jobs
governed by different union locals and restoring lost seniority not actionable as collective bargain-
ing agreements were virtually identical and only relevant differences were the specific positions
and their rate of pay), on further consideration, 812 F.Supp. 808 (N.D. Iii. 1992).
141. As the plurality noted in Wygant:
A worker may invest many productive years in one job and one city with the expecta-
tion of earning the stability and security of seniority. "At that point, the rights and
expectations surrounding seniority make up what is probably the most valuable capi-
tal asset that the worker 'owns,' worth even more than the current equity in his
home."
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion) (quoting Richard
H. Fallon, Jr. & Paul Weiler, Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 58).
Though the citation refers specifically to the rights of unionized workers, non-unionized workers
often have parallel legitimate contractual expectations.
142. See, e.g., Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1251 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that cause of
action survives if employee "was an 'at will' and probationary employee who was denied 'perma-
nent employee status [since] [t]he Personnel Handbook makes clear that permanent employees
have rights, privileges and benefits not available to probationary employees"); Bohanan v. United
Parcel Serv., 918 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1990), reported in full, No. 90-3155, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
20154 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1990) (holding actionable promotion from part-time to full-time supervi-
sor as promotion would increase pay, stock shares, and supervisory responsibilities); see also Suggs
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 2774 (LLM), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5631 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 30, 1991) at "12-13 (ruling actionable promotion that would entail move from one collective
bargaining unit to another actionable because of loss of seniority and overtime pay, etc.).
143. See, e.g., Busch v. St. Xavier College, No. 90 C 5285, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 421, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 1991) (holding promotion claim viable). The result here should not be a prod-
uct of the fact that tenure ensures permanent employment, since that seems irrelevant in other
cases where duties and responsibilities otherwise remain the same. Perhaps the difference is that
tenure also may provide a faculty member significant additional rights, such as the ability to vote
on appointments and promotions, and these may establish a new contractual relationship with the
employer.
144. Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 169-70 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 956 (1992).
145. Id.; accord Revis v. Slocomb Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (D. Del. 1993).
After the quoted language in the text, the Bennun court stated that "[h]olders of these two
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means under § 1981 for an employee to make a new contract or
achieve "a new and distinct relation"14 6 with an employer.
A final anomaly arises from a potential peculiarity in the logic of
promotion cases. Consider a current employee of a hypothetical firm
and a candidate from outside the firm who are both applying for the
same job. If the applications of both are rejected on racial grounds,
should it be the case that the current employee has no cause of ac-
tion under § 1981 because the promotion does not rise to the level
of a new employment relationship, whereas the applicant would
have a viable action under a refusal to contract claim? Judge Posner
was the first to raise this issue in the 1989 Seventh Circuit case of
Malhotra v. Cotter & Co.14 7 If the two situations should be treated
similarly, then § 1981 should protect these kinds of promotions, but
would not protect the more routine promotions, for example an in-
grade advance, available only to present employees.14 8 The Malho-
tra court did not resolve the propriety of this approach, for it re-
manded the issue back to the district court.14 9 Yet the question gen-
erated significant diverse commentary from other members of the
Malhotra panel.150
My interest in the anomaly identified is twofold. First, what does
it say about the ease of the application of § 1981 under the Patter-
son Court's interpretation that such anomalies arise? Is the test
positions do nothing different day-in and day-out except for those few weeks out of the year when
they evaluate candidates, if any, for a full professorship." Bennun, 941 F.2d at 169. Under this
standard, is the difference between the duties of non-tenured and tenured faculty of such signifi-
cant difference that a promotion from one to the other rises to the level of a new contractual
relationship with the employer?
146. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989).
147. 885 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1989).
148. Id. Attention to the implications of this test may be one reason the more widely adopted
functional test differentiates between routine and non-routine promotions. See supra note 136 and
accompanying text. One commentator notes:
The following standard fulfills the Patterson Court's mandate: A promotion consti-
tutes a "new and distinct relation" cognizable under § 1981 where there has been a
tangible change in responsibilities and wages, and the discriminatorily denied promo-
tion is not granted routinely to similarly situated workers.
Fagel, Comment, supra note 95, at 923.
149. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1318.
150. For Judge Cudahy, the test was appropriate, since nothing in Patterson justified the differ-
ent statutory treatment of current employee and outside applicant. Id. at 1317 n.6 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring). Judge Ripple disagreed and held that the test would undermine rather than faithfully
apply Patterson. Id. at 1317-18 (Ripple, J., concurring). Judge Ripple did agree, though, that
whether a position can be filled by an outsider may be a factor in assessing the viability of an
employee's promotion claim. Id. at 1317 (Ripple, J., concurring).
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Judge Posner discussed 151 a clarification of the Supreme Court's test
or one, on the basis of case experience, that modified it? These
problems in application raise the question of whether the Court is
correct in its interpretation of the meaning of § 1981.151
Second, according to Judge Posner, the "new and distinct rela-
tion"15 s pressed by current employees' promotion claims is some-
thing other than a new and distinct contractual relation. The issue
here, then, he stated, was whether the Patterson Court's test "em-
braces promotions which, while nonroutine, involve no change in the
terms of the express or implied contractual relationship between em-
ployee and employer. '5 4 I question whether these promotions so
clearly do not involve a change in the contractual relationship.
Should the focus be only on duties or responsibilities, and on only
those duties and responsibilities stipulated by express or implied
contract? Or, to put it another way, what terms comprise in actual-
ity the implied contract? Is not the change, for example, from part-
time to full-time employee, despite the consistency in job activities,
a change in the contractual relationship between employee and em-
ployer? Do changes in job, reputation, or employment status func-
tion simply within a pre-existing contract, or do these changes mod-
ify the contract? At what point is a contract made or remade?
151. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
152. In other words, if application of the Court's test has illogical results, then the test should
not be so applied, as the result could not have been intended. Cf Public Citizen v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (19891 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that where the plain
language of a statute would lead to absurd results that could not have been intended, courts need
not apply the language in such a fashion). One response, of course, is that the problem, if any, lies
not with the Court but with Congress. Judge Ripple wrote:
As the [Malhotra] majority suggests, there may be a lack of symmetry in a regula-
tory scheme that provides different remedies to those who are already employees of
the defendant and those who have no preexisting contractual relationship with the
defendant. I do not see how that condition, an accident of history or of political will,
permits us to revise the scheme. If making statutes logical or symmetrical was the
judicial task, we would be a law revision commission, not a court.
Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1317-18 (Ripple, J., concurring). It may also be true that any anomaly
presented is mitigated by an employee's remaining ability to bring suit under Title VII, see e.g.,
White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1546 (E.D. Va. 1990); but this coordination
of Title VII and § 1981 does not alter the propriety of inquiry into either the logic of § 1981 or
the Court's interpretation of this logic. As the Patterson Court itself stated, the fact that racial
harassment is forbidden under Title VII may be a sign of Congress's understanding of the reach
of § 1981 and, more importantly, "should lessen the temptation of this Court to twist the inter-
pretation" of § 1981. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 (1989). The crux
remains the nature of § 1981, not whether other statutes mitigate its effects.
153. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185.
154. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1311.
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Judge Posner at least raised the question of whether the barrier of
some express or implied contract should divide actionable from non-
actionable § 1981 promotion claims. My question is whether this
barrier constrains acknowledgment of the extent to which a contrac-
tual relationship changes, despite the possible lack of change in
some more formal contract. If the boundary is vague between when
a contract does and does not change, or between when a contract is
made or remade, that also pushes the boundary between viable and
nonviable § 1981 claims. The post-Patterson § 1981 promotion
claims provide the evidence of how slippery in application this divid-
ing line may be.
IV. TRANSFER CLAIMS
Some courts have rejected the viability of transfer cases out of
hand, on the ground that transfers do not create the opportunity for
a new contract with an employer but are simply a continuation of a
previous contractual relationship.1" Others raised the more subtle
issue whether, if under Patterson the change must be a change in
contractual status, a transfer is ever of this character. "6 Under this
logic, a transfer is more akin to a routine promotion, part of the
typical progression in a career, "and it would be very odd to regard
each rung on the career ladder as a different employment relation
... .The turn of the rotation wheel does not create a new employ-
ment relation at each stop. ' '157
Another alternative, also similar to the promotion cases,158 is to
focus less on a change in contractual status than on the qualitative
nature of the change. Because a transfer generally does not entail
much, if any, increase in compensation or responsibility, it would
155. See, e.g., Jones v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 977 F.2d 527, 537 (11th Cir. 1992);
White v. Federal Express, Corp., 939 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1991); Berry v. General Motors
Corp., 796 F. Supp. 1409, 1426 (D. Kan. 1992).
156. See, e.g., McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 110 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.) (raising but not deciding the issue), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991). A change in contrac-
tual status would be on the order of a move from employee to company officer or partner. Id.
157. Id. But see Franceschi v. Edo Corp., 736 F. Supp. 438, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating, "it
would seem that a lateral transfer . . . would more likely require an employer and employee to
enter a new contract than a promotion which is often simply a condition of the already existing
contract"). The Franceschi court held, however, that the transfer at issue did not rise to the level
of a new and distinct relation and so was not actionable. Id. My question is whether even routine
changes do perhaps alter the contractual relationship.
158. See supra notes 75-154 and accompanying text.
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not be actionable. 159 If, on the other hand, the transfer is to another
division of the company and the job is significantly different, a
transfer claim might be viable. 160 A modest increase in wages upon
transfer, then, is not sufficient; "otherwise every raise would be
deemed the formation of a new contract."I6'
Again the question is whether this latter conclusion is reached
through application of the Patterson Court's textualist clarification
of § 1981's meaning or through attention to the supposed intent ly-
ing behind and framing the Court's interpretation of the statute.
Consider, for example, a case where an employer offered employees
a relocation program that included numerous inducements. 6" An
African-American employee started to participate but had to with-
draw because the inducements were not sufficient to offset other
costs. 63 Later she learned that white employees allegedly received
relocation benefits in excess of those offered her.164 The court held
her § 1981 transfer claim was not actionable:
If the court were to conclude that the simple use of the words offer and
acceptance in the relocation brochure constituted a new and distinct rela-
tionship between the parties then the court would by inference be supporting
the proposition that "every step down the path of one's career.[sic]" does
create a new and distinct relationship because in each change of position, an
employee, whether expressly or impliedly, "accepts" the change in position
with at least some minimal change in terms, whether it be in pay, benefits,
title, duties, or location. Such a conclusion would allow every employee to
argue that there was at minimum an implied offer and acceptance by the
very nature of the slightest change in job position. This result would be in
direct contrast to the analysis set forth in Patterson."e
159. See, e.g., Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1648 (1994); Waller v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 767 F. Supp. 1548,
1558 (D. Kan. 1991); Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (E.D.N.Y.
1990).
160. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 110 (discussing but not resolving the issue). Judge Posner also
invoked the possible utility, raised first in the promotion setting, see supra note 147 and accompa-
nying text, of examining whether a transfer claim should be viable depending on whether the new
position might be assumed by an applicant from outside the company rather than a more routine
move available only to current employees. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 110.
161. Bush, 990 F.2d at 932.
162. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 92-2864, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16817,
at *13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 1992).
163. Id. at *14.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *19. Note the emphasis that small changes affect a change in the contractual rela-
tionship. This is in contrast to Judge Posner's proposition that some significant, nonroutine
changes may be actionable even though they effect "no change in the terms of the express or
implied contractual relationship between employee and employer." Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885
F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
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Was there or was there not a change in the employment relationship
here? If there was, does not § 1981 require that the claim be ac-
tionable? On what grounds can it be said that the statute requires
the change to be "significant" in order to cross the statutory
threshold?
V. DEMOTION CLAIMS
Demotion claims form a point of transition between promotion or
transfer claims and claims of discriminatory discharge. For those
courts which have treated demotion claims as actionable, they gen-
erally do so because the demotion, like an actionable promotion, is a
significant one, and the level of change creates a "new and distinct
relation"16 ' between employee and employer.1 67 Under these cases,
the fact that a demotion was in one sense postformation conduct is
irrelevant because the issue was whether the demotion involved for-
mation conduct, in this situation as in promotions the making of a
new contract.
Some cases that rejected demotion claims did so simply on the
ground that a demotion was postformation conduct.168 Given the
survival of some promotion claims, which technically require
166. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989).
167. See, e.g., Kriegel v. Home Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 1538, 1540 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (holding
that "substantial" demotion claims remain actionable); Nelson v. School Bd., 738 F. Supp. 478,
479-80 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (involving demotion from position as school principal to position as class-
room teacher); DeBailey v. Lynch-Davidson Motors, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 974, 977 (M.D. Fla.
1990) (observing that plaintiff would have gone from "a supervisory position to a non-supervisory
position, her job responsibilities were to have been completely altered, and her pay was to have
been cut in half"). Offering a broader rationale is Gamboa v. Washington, 716 F. Supp. 353
(N.D. Ill. 1989) in which the court noted that "[the] plaintiff cannot recover for discipline or
harassment not amounting to a demotion or a constructive discharge." Id. at 359.
One commentator argued that although the viability of most promotion cases depend on
whether the promotion is routine or more significant, that "analysis is not clearly applicable to
demotions. Although a demotion like a promotion necessarily involves a change in jobs, few demo-
tions can be considered 'routine.'" Frederickson, supra note 29, at 905 n.90.
168. See, e.g., Berry v. General Motors Corp., 796 F. Supp. 1409, 1426 (D. Kan. 1992) (stat-
ing that "[d]emotion claims ... do not involve contract formation or enforcement and are not
actionable under section 1981."); Guliford v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 768 F. Supp. 313, 320 (D.
Kan. 1991) (asserting that "[p]laintiff's demotion claims do not involve either the making of a
contract or its enforcement."); Duse v. IBM Corp., 748 F. Supp. 956, 961 (D. Conn. 1990) (de-
claring that "an employer's demotion and discharge of an employee, even where racially moti-
vated, is outside the scope of § 1981."); Franceschi v. Edo Corp., 736 F. Supp. 438, 442-43
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding plaintiff's demotion claim not actionable under §1981); Alexander v.
New York Medical College, 721 F. Supp. 587, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting that because
"[d]emotions . . . take place after the initial employment contract is made. . . . they do not
implicate the process of making an employment contract").
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postformation conduct of at least some quality, this formalism is in-
sufficient. More rigorous judicial denials of demotion claims typi-
cally acknowledged that significant demotions may create a new and
distinct relationship between employer and employee.169 They em-
phasized, however, that a demotion claim, unlike a promotion claim,
should be characterized more as an objection to the course of con-
duct in the old relationship, rather than to the formation of the new
one.
17 0
As this analysis elucidates, what is striking about demotion claims
is that analytically they bear resemblance to both promotion claims
and to discharge claims. Like discharge claims, M  demotion claims
are in one sense disputes arising over the ending of an existing con-
tractual relationship; as such, they register an objection to
postformation conduct and are, therefore, not viable after Patterson.
Yet like promotion claims, demotion claims also protest the alleg-
edly discriminatory terms of the "new" contractual relationship.
Cases rejecting demotion claims have responded to this analysis in
two ways. First, some decisions held promotion claims, but not de-
motion claims, viable because the former rest on an employer's dis-
criminatory refusal to enter a new contract, while the latter present
no such refusal. 172 This distinction fails, however, because as Patter-
169. By contrast an early demotion denial did not only rest on the fact that demotion is
postformation conduct, but also insisted that "there was no 'new' contract at issue. ... Wil-
liams v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 716 F. Supp. 49, 51 (D.D.C. 1989), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1131
(D.C. Cir. 1990).
170. See, e.g., Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 760 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (N.D. Ill.
1991) ("Although ... significant demotions may lead to 'new and distinct relations' between the
employer-demoter and the employee-demotee - those similarities are not significant for section
1981 purposes . . . .The discrimination in demotion cases does not occur in the formation of the
new relationship; rather, it lies in the termination of the old."), onfurther consideration, 984 F.2d
1467 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993); Newton v. A.B. Dick Co., 738 F. Supp.
952, 954 (D. Md. 1990) (noting that, "it is far more logical to view a demotion as a change in the
terms of a continuing employment relationship rather than the beginning of a new one"); Jackson
v. GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 734 F. Supp. 258, 266 (N.D. Tex. 1990) ("A demoted employee
is not complaining of discrimination in the making of a new contract, but is instead urging that he
was discriminated against in his previous position."); Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 732 F.
Supp. 895, 899 (N.D. Il1. 1990) ("While a new contractual relationship may have arisen after the
demotion, this new contract is not the source of the § 1981 claim."), affd, 990 F.2d 928 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1648 (1994); Barr v. Wittek Mfg. Co., No. 87 C 2940, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2302, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 1990) (noting that "[elven if a demotion involves a
new contractual relation, the complained-of conduct is not the creation of a new contract, but
rather the termination of the existing contract").
171. Discharge claims will be discussed at greater length shortly. See infra notes 179-249 and
accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Duse, 748 F. Supp. at 962 n.6 (noting that a failure to promote claim may be
viable but that a demotion or discharge does not involve "the denial of an opportunity for the
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son details, § 1981 prohibits both "the refusal to enter into a con-
tract with someone, as well as the offer to make a contract only on
discriminatory terms. ' 7 8 Second and more substantively, a number
of demotion denial decisions dismissed the analytic analogy between
demotion and promotion, finding the resemblance between demotion
and discharge much more compelling.1 74 As we have seen, these
courts have held that demotion cases are ultimately not a protest
about terms of a new contract but about postformation conduct
under the old one. 176 These holdings are maintained despite the fact
that if the significant change in job positions occurred in reverse
order and the dispute was now over a promotion rather than a de-
motion, the claim would survive. 171
The courts' concerns here are understandable. They contend
plaintiffs should not be allowed to subvert the limits of § 1981 by
transforming their claims into something they are not.17 7 Patterson
has underscored this point in its admonishing lower courts "not [to]
strain in an undue manner the language of § 1981 .'178 And yet the
issue remains: are demotion claims not protected because of fidelity
to the statutory language or, rather, because of deference to the
Court's restrictive interpretive intent? Demotions have a dual char-
acter: they are at once the outgrowth of an existing contract and the
initiation of a new one. If a demotion displays this duality, why
should a court come down on the side that the claim represents only
postformation conduct? If a demotion also involves new contract
plaintiff to enter into a new contract with the defendant."); Newton, 738 F. Supp. at 954 (stating
that "where in a claim for discrimination in promotions the new contract ... is being denied on
the basis of race,. . . [in a claim for discriminatory demotion] the new contract ... was in fact
offered to the claimant"); Jordan v. United States W. Direct Co., 716 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (D.
Colo. 1989) (declaring that "[i]n the case of an alleged wrongful demotion, as opposed to a failure
to promote, there is no refusal by the employer to enter into a new contract with the employee").
173. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989).
174. See, e.g., Bush, 990 F.2d at 932-33 ("The decisive point is that under Patterson the dis-
charge of a worker on racial grounds is not actionable; and demotions should be treated the same
way ...."); Von Zuckerstein, 760 F. Supp. at 1316 ("The analogy to discharge cases . . . is
more persuasive ....").
Whether a discharge claim should be held not actionable under Patterson is a point to which
we shall return. See infra notes 179-249 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 168.
176. See, e.g., Newton, 738 F. Supp. at 955 (explicitly acknowledging this result).
177. See, e.g., Bush, 990 F.2d at 933 ("A worker who has been fired, demoted or transferred
should not be allowed to circumvent Patterson by seeking reinstatement, promotion, or retransfer
and characterizing the employer's refusal as the refusal of a new contract.").
178. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989). This language has been
explicitly cited in the demotion context. See Jackson v. GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 734 F. Supp.
258, 266 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (heeding the Supreme Court's admonition).
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formation and the statute protects the making of a contract, should
not a demotion claim be actionable under § 1981? More generally,
the dual character of demotions heightens the difficulty earlier seen
in promotion and transfer cases of drawing a dividing line between
formation and postformation conduct, between making a contract
and working on the basis of an existing one. Once again, the mean-
ing of § 1981 ascertained by the Patterson Court stubbornly resists
easy or mechanical application.
VI. DISCHARGE CLAIMS
Discriminatory discharge claims represent the most frequently lit-
igated type of § 1981 claim post-Patterson. Of the more than 960
§ 1981 claims decided by the courts since Patterson, nearly 275
were discriminatory or constructive discharges. 179 Only harassment
claims approach that count. 180 Of the nearly 275 discharge claims,
just over 10 were ever found viable.1 81 Even this small group was
effectively overruled when ultimately all circuits which decided the
issue ruled that after Patterson, § 1981 does not protect against dis-
criminatory discharge.182 Given the resolution of discharge claims
179. See infra Appendix. Henceforth, I shall incorporate without further differentiation con-
structive discharge claims into the discussion of discriminatory discharge claims, since they are
typically analyzed interchangeably. See, e.g., McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104,
110 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) ("We have just held that explicit discharges are not actionable
under section 1981. No more are constructive discharges."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).
Hereafter, all constructive or discriminatory discharge claims will simply be called "discharge"
claims. These should be distinguished from retaliatory discharge claims, which generally are eval-
uated not under the right to make a contract but under the right to enforce a contract. See supra
note 29.
180. Just under 250 harassment or discriminatory conditions claims have been adjudicated
post-Patterson. See infra Appendix.
181. See infra Appendix.
182. See Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (agree-
ing with other courts of appeal which have "almost universally interpreted Patterson to mean that
termination of a contract is not covered by § 1981 because termination constitutes postformation
conduct"), vacated on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 960 (1992), aff'd, 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir.
1992); Gonzalez v. Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that "we are not inclined
to view the termination of a contract as involving either its 'mak[ing]' or its 'enforce[ment]' ");
Hayes v. Community Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that dis-
criminatory "discharge is not actionable under § 1981"), cert. denied. 112 S. Ct. 940 (1992);
Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1990) (concurring with majority
of courts of appeal and holding that discriminatory discharge claims are not viable under § 1981),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2259 (1991); Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d
805, 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (declaring that "termination amount[s] to postformation conduct. ...
[and] is not actionable under section 1981"); Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d
1255, 1258 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding it unnecessary "to apply section 1981 to discharge cases"),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1250 (1991); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 108-09
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since Patterson, it would at first appear that in this area if anywhere
at all the Court's belief was well-founded that lower courts would
have "little difficulty applying the straightforward principles that we
announce today." 183
Of course, as the Patterson decision itself attested, consensus in
the courts of appeals does not necessarily coincide with the Supreme
Court's textualist judgment if faced with that same issue. 184 And
the paramount test is not the fact of agreement among various
courts but the analytical persuasiveness of these courts' reasoning. It
is relevant to point out, for instance, that several courts of appeals'
decisions denying the viability of § 1981 discharge claims were met
by vigorous dissents.1 8 5
(7th Cir. 1990) (stating that discriminatory termination does not infringe the right to make a
contract), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991); Taggart v. Jefferson County Child Support Enforce-
ment Unit, 935 F.2d 947, 948 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (concluding that "Patterson bars discrim-
inatory discharge claims under section 1981"); Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance
Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[d]ischarge is the type of
postformation 'breach of contract' conduct not protected by section 1981"); Trujillo v. Grand
Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with other appellate courts
which have concluded that "a claim for discriminatory discharge cannot be asserted under section
1981"); Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1991) (determining that
"Patterson's interpretation of § 1981 precludes claims for retaliatory discharge ... and ...
discriminatory discharge claims as well").
Of the regional circuits, only the First has not been faced with a discriminatory discharge
claim.
183. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 n.6 (1989).
184. For instance, of the courts of appeals cases to examine racial harassment claims under
§ 1981 prior to Patterson, only the Fourth Circuit Patterson case, 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986),
challenged the statute's applicability. See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 31-32 & n.4 (citing cases).
Of more direct relevance to discharge claims, there was little question prior to Patterson that
these claims were covered by § 1981. See, e.g., Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 638
n.18 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing cases).
185. Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1574-78 (Wald, J., dissenting in part); Prather, 918 F.2d at 1259-
62 (Boggs, J., dissenting); Wilmer v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 919 F.2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir.
1990) (Jones, J., dissenting); McKnight, 908 F.2d at 117-18 (Fairchild, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); Weaver, 922 F.2d at 1530-31 (Clark, J., concurring); Taggart, 935 F.2d at
949-50 (McMillan, J., dissenting) (citing Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 637-40 (8th
Cir. 1990) which held that § 1981 discharge claims are actionable). Hicks was vacated and re-
manded for further consideration in light of the en bane opinion to be filed in Taggart, 499 U.S.
914 (1991), and eventually reversed, adhering to Taggart. 946 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir. 1991).
As perhaps more concrete evidence of the intensity of feelings on the issue, consider the subse-
quent proceedings in Hicks. The Hicks case was again appealed to the Supreme Court and the
Court again vacated for reconsideration in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Hicks v. Brown
Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1255 (1992). In an en banc decision on remand, the Eighth Circuit held
that the Civil Rights Act did not apply retroactively, therefore reinstating the earlier panel verdict
that after Taggart Hicks had no viable discharge claim under § 1981. Hicks v. Brown Group,
Inc., 982 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc). As part of Judge Heaney's dissent, he argued that
he still thought Judge McMillan's original panel opinion in Hicks, 902 F.2d 630, was "the better
view of the law" and urged that "[b]ecause the Supreme Court did not specifically address the
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Despite the general uniformity in discharge rulings, I want to
show that discharge claims exhibit many of the same difficulties as
other claims in the application of the Patterson Court's distinction
between formation and postformation conduct. It will take a few
steps to get to that point, however, as discharge claims present some
distinctive characteristics under Patterson. We should recognize ini-
tially that the Patterson Court was not directly faced with a dis-
charge issue. Whereas harassment and promotion claims were ex-
plicitly before the Court and derivative implications about transfer
and demotion claims can arguably be drawn, Patterson did not spe-
cifically discuss the viability of discharge claims under § 1981.186
This silence has forced courts to apply Patterson's interpretation of
§ 1981 to claims the Court did not in any direct way consider.
Hence, discharge claims again raise the question whether the act of
application involves primarily the derivation from or a recasting of
general principles. Courts have responded to the challenge of dis-
charge claims in a variety of ways. Some have held that these
claims may be analyzed the same under Patterson as all other
claims. 187 At the other extreme, some courts have held that the logic
of Patterson is simply not relevant to discharge cases. 188 In between
these poles are decisions insisting that the reasoning in Patterson
requires distinctive treatment of discharge claims.1 89 The methods of
these cases vary as well, ranging from broader attempts to deduce
the Court's intent on the subject to more narrow attention to dis-
cerning the implications of the Court's textualist analysis of the
statute. As always, the latter quest is my more specific interest, but
the other analyses provide an important frame to this inquiry.
A. Patterson as Distinguishable?
Particularly for those courts or dissents judging that discharge
claims are viable under § 1981, the fact that the Patterson Court
issue of discriminatory discharge in Patterson, it is my hope that it will accept certiorari in this
case and resolve the issue once and for all." Hicks. 982 F.2d at 299 (Heaney, J., dissenting). A
petition for certiorari was subsequently filed on this issue, but the Court denied the petition. 114
S.Ct. 1642 (1994).
186. Brenda Patterson did file a § 1981 discriminatory discharge claim. Patterson, 491 U.S. at
169. However, this issue was not presented to the Supreme Court. Id. at 170-71.
187. See infra notes 220-49 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 202-05, 213-19 and accompanying text. Some decisions combine these
approaches.
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did not discuss discharges is quite telling. They pointed out that
prior to Patterson, numerous lower 'courts held § 1981 protected
against discriminatory discharge1 0 and that the Court had itself
been presented with several § 1981 discharge cases where the via-
bility of these claims, though not directly before the Court, were
never challenged. 191 Additionally held relevant is the fact that the
Patterson majority, while objecting to much of Justice Brennan's
dissent, did not challenge his statement that in passing § 1981,
Congress intended to prevent discriminatory discharge.19' Further,
some judges noted 93 that two Supreme Court cases subsequent to
Patterson expressed the view that the viability of § 1981 discharge
claims was still open.19' The courts and dissents concluded that be-
cause precedent prior to Patterson held § 1981 discharge claims ac-
tionable and because Patterson did not challenge these precedents,
discharge claims remain viable."
190. See, e.g., Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 638 n.18 (citing cases); McGinnis v.
Ingram Equip. Co., 918 F.2d 1491, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1990) (Hill, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority
cites no cases prior to Patterson stating that racially discriminatory discharge is not actionable
under section 1981."); Asare v. Syms, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1049, 1052 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 20, 1989) (citing cases).
191. See, e.g., Hicks, 902 F.2d at 637-38 (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656
(1987); Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 275 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975)).
Some courts also acknowledged that Johnson was specifically mentioned in Patterson without
any indication that the discriminatory discharge claim present in that case was no longer viable.
See, e.g., Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1531 (1lth Cir. 1991) (Clark, J., concur-
ring); Hicks, 902 F.2d at 637-38; McDonald, 427 U.S. at 285.
192. See, e.g., Hicks, 902 F.2d at 638 ("Congress intended [,in the employment context,] 'to go
beyond protecting the freedmen from refusals to contract for their labor and from discriminatory
decisions to discharge them.' ") (quoting Brennan's statement from Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 206 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)); Prather
v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1990) (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(citing Brennan statement); McKnight, 908 F.2d at 118 (Fairchild, J., dissenting) (quoting Bren-
nan statement).
193. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565, 1575 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Wald, J., dissenting); Prather, 918 F.2d at 1262 (Boggs, J., dissenting); Hicks, 902 F.2d at 637;
Kriegel v. Home Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 1538, 1539 (N.D. Ga. 1990), overturned by Weaver, 922
F.2d at 1515.
194. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 551 n.3 (1990) ("On remand, the
Fourth Circuit should consider the impact of Patterson on Lytle's § 1981 [discriminatory dis-
charge and retaliation] claims."); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 711 (1989)
("[Wie assume for purposes of these cases, without deciding, that petitioner's rights under § 1981
have been violated by his removal and reassignment."); see also Lytle. 494 U.S. at 556
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "the question whether the petitioner has stated a valid
claim under § 1981 remains open").
195. See, e.g., Hicks, 902 F.2d at 635 ("A careful analysis of Patterson demonstrates that
discharge was not at issue or discussed, and nothing in that opinion requires us to overrule the
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These arguments did not find favor in the federal circuits. 196 They
can be contested on their own grounds, but that discussion need not
detain us here. 19 7 Because these arguments do not focus judgment
on the Patterson Court's interpretation of the statutory text, their
merits may be set aside for the purposes of this Article. 198
numerous and long-settled cases in this circuit which hold that discriminatory discharge is action-
able under Section 1981."); Asare v. Syms, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1049, 1052
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1989) ("Nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson requires this
court to conclude that § 1981 is no longer an appropriate vehicle by which to challenge a dismis-
sal motivated by racial animus."). Stated in broader terms, the argument is, in the words of a
dissenter to this line of thought, that "Patterson is not a controlling precedent in this case."
Hicks, 902 F.2d at 656 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
A similar logic may have been at work in Jackson v. City of Albuquerque where the court in a
footnote at the very end of the opinion addressed the applicability of Patterson to a discriminatory
discharge claim. 890 F.2d 225, 236 n.15 (10th Cir. 1989). The court held that Patterson "do[es]
not affect either the analysis or outcome of this case." Id. Interestingly, however, in subsequent
cases discussing the availability of a discharge claim under § 1981, the Tenth Circuit has made
no reference to Jackson or to its precedential value. See, e.g., Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional
Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 975-76 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding discriminatory discharge claim under sec-
tion 1981 not viable after Patterson); Hill v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., 918 F.2d 877, 880-81
(10th Cir. 1990) (discussing precedents in other circuits but then deciding the case on the merits).
196. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
197. Some possible responses are the following: If Supreme Court § 1981 discharge cases prior
to Patterson simply assumed the viability of the cause of action, this should have no bearing on a
decision on the merits. Or, take the fact that two Supreme Court cases subsequent to Patterson
noted that the viability of § 1981 discharge claims was still open. This observation could simply
indicate that Patterson did not address the issue explicitly, something that expresses no necessary
uncertainty about the import of the Patterson analysis when facing such a case. See Gersman, 931
F.2d at 1570 n.l; Carter v. Sedgwick County, 929 F.2d 1501, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1991); Trujillo,
928 F.2d at 975. Or finally, consider the fact that the Patterson majority did not respond to
Justice Brennan's comment that the intent of Congress in passing § 1981 was, among other
things, to prevent discriminatory discharge. Justice Brennan derives this intent from a study of the
legislative history. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 206 (1989). Just as it also
ignores legislative history in the same Brennan passage that Congress intended § 1981 to apply to
acts of harassment occurring after a contract was formed, see id., the Court may ignore this
evidence out of fidelity to its textualist orientation.
198. It is worthy of note that non-textualist searches for the Court's intent regarding discharge
claims were not limited to those holding for the viability of these claims. A most instructive exam-
ple appears in a concurring opinion in the Eighth Circuit's en banc decision in Taggart v. Jefferson
County Child Support Enforcement, 935 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1991). The court convened in Tag-
gart to review the merits of Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990), which had
been followed but questioned in the Taggart panel opinion. 915 F.2d 396, 397 (8th Cir. 1990). At
the time of the en banc review, Hicks was the only circuit court opinion nationwide that upheld
the viability of § 1981 discharge claims. Taggart, 935 F.2d at 948. See also supra note 185
(describing Hicks as the only court of appeals decision then or subsequently to so hold). With
virtually no other discussion than a citation to the circuit opinions elsewhere, the en banc court
sided with the weight of authority and against Hicks. Hicks, 935 F.2d at 948. This judgment was
formally acknowledged in a later Hicks opinion. 946 F.2d 1344, 1345 (8th Cir. 1991).
In the en banc Taggart decision, Judge Loken concurred. 935 F.2d at 948-49. For reasons
beyond the scope of this Article, Judge Loken disagreed with the decisions in the other circuits
but nevertheless joined the majority conclusion on the following grounds: that the Supreme Court
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B. The Implications of Patterson
For a perspective more reliant on the Patterson Court's interpre-
tation of § 1981, discriminatory discharges will be held actionable
or not depending on whether they can be linked to contract forma-
tion or are instead depicted as simply an instance of postformation
conduct. For some courts holding discharge actions not viable, it
had remanded Hicks expressly for reconsideration in light of the en banc decision in Taggart and
the Court had also denied the petition for certiorari in McKnight v. General Motors Corp., in
which the Seventh Circuit had held discharge claims not actionable. Id. at 949. Judge Loken
concluded that these actions demonstrated the Supreme Court's judgment that after Patterson,
§ 1981 did not permit discriminatory discharge claims. Id.
This conclusion is remarkable. While it is true that denials of certiorari, for example, can have
important practical consequences for the area of law affected, see generally H. W. PERRY. JR.,
DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991), the
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that "the 'denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expres-
sion of opinion upon the merits of the case.' The 'variety of considerations [that] underlie denials
of the writ' counsels against according denials of certiorari any precedential value." Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (citations omitted). See also Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The Court has said this again and again; again and
again the admonition has to be repeated.").
For our purposes, it is relevant to consider what may have been the "variety of considerations"
that led the Court to vacate Hicks and deny certiorari in McKnight. (In this context the vacatur is
sufficiently similar to a denial of certiorari as an indeterminate expression of the Court's intent.)
What else can these decisions possibly mean other than an intent to deny the viability of § 1981
discharge claims?
As previously mentioned, the Court vacated and remanded Hicks to the Eighth Circuit so that
the appeals court might reconsider that case in light of the decision to rehear Taggart en banc.
The vacatur occurred on March 18, 1991. 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991). Taggart was submitted en banc
on February 13, 1991 and decided on June 6, 1991. 935 F.2d 947 (1991). The Court remand
might then have had the following diverse consequences. On the one hand, the Taggart decision
might have rejected - as it did - the Hicks reasoning and joined the other circuits in holding
§ 1981 did not protect against discriminatory discharge. If this occurred, circuit conflict would be
eliminated. As it did in McKnight, the Court could then deny any other petition for certiorari on
the issue, not necessarily because it agreed with the judgments of the lower courts but perhaps as
a matter of judicial economy. The latter is not simply hypothetical. At the time of the vacatur,
Congress was considering passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which if passed might - as it
did - eliminate any question of whether § 1981 covered discharges. P.L. 101-166 § 101(b), 105
Stat. 1071, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991). On the other hand, if the en banc Taggart court had
reached the same conclusion as did the Hicks panel, a petition for review of Hicks could again
have been filed for review by the Supreme Court, and the Court would have had the chance to
determine whether or not it wanted to resolve the conflict among the circuits.
All of these alternatives are contained in the Hicks Supreme Court amicus brief filed by the
Solicitor General. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at 9-11,
Brown Group, Inc. v. Hicks, No. 90-324, (Feb. 1991). The ultimate action taken by the Court -
the vacatur for reconsideration in light of Taggart - was exactly the recommendation urged by
the Solicitor General. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 10. This is not to suggest that the
amicus brief provides evidence of the Supreme Court's actual intent here - which is unknown -
but it does indicate that a variety of reasons may have motivated the Court's action and that such
action may provide no indication of how the Court would rule on the viability of § 1981 discharge
claims were it ever to face the issue directly.
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suffices that termination necessarily occurs after a contract has been
formed and is obviously therefore postformation conduct.1 99 Given,
however, that a promotion is clearly postformation conduct and that
some promotions survive Patterson,0 0 this argument cannot do.2°1
The question is whether discharges, even if postformation, implicate
the right to make a contract.
1. Discharge as Affecting the Right to Contract
Many courts holding discharge claims actionable point to a fun-
damental characteristic of discharge. Whereas other postformation
conduct, such as racial harassment, impinges on the enjoyment of a
contract, discharge destroys the complete existence of the contract
because "discriminatory discharge goes to the very existence and
nature of the employment contract. A discriminatory discharge
completely deprives the employee of his or her employment, the very
essence of the right to make employment contracts.' 2 0 2 Analogizing
199. See, e.g., Duse v. IBM Corp., 748 F. Supp. 956, 961 (D. Conn. 1990) (quoting Hall);
Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721, 723 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[U]nder Patterson, once an
individual has secured employment, the statute's protection of the right to make a contract is at
an end."). A bit more subtle variant of this reasoning also appears in the cases: "[T]he plain
language of the Supreme Court in Patterson rejects any claim based on actions which occur after
the contract has been formed. Patterson clearly held that section 1981's right to make contracts
provision governs only conduct prior to the formation of the contract. ... Williams v. First
Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 593 (1991). This
statement appears to indicate that the Court has established a bright-line between formation and
postformation conduct, and discharge claims fall unmistakably on one side of that line. As the
Williams court observed, this reasoning finds direct support in Patterson, where the Court held
that "the right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to
conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established ....". Id. (quoting
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177). As we immediately proceed to discuss in the text, however, these
statements in Williams and Patterson must be examined within the larger context that some
postformation conduct is in fact held to be actionable, such as certain promotions.
200. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185-86.
201. See, e.g., Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1260 (6th Cir. 1990)
(Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting that the Patterson Court held that postformation conduct is not
protected by § 1981, yet promotions, which may be considered postformation conduct, are pro-
tected by § 1981. "These two principles point to directly opposite conclusions .... ").
202. Hicks, 902 F.2d at 639 (emphasis added); accord Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1577 (Wald, J.,
dissenting) (noting that, "discriminatory contract termination involves nothing less than the com-
plete unmaking of contracts"); Prather, 918 F.2d at 1259 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("A common
sense understanding of § 1981 is that the right to be free from discrimination in the making of a
contract includes the right to be free from discrimination in the unilateral termination of that
contract."); Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490 (D. Colo. 1989) ("Termination
affects the existence of the contract, not merely the terms of its performance."), rev'd, 950 F.2d
654 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Ginwright v. United Sch. Dist. No. 457, 756 F. Supp. 1458, 1472
(D. Kan. 1991) (quoting Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490); Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 748 F.
Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Kansas, 1990) (quoting Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490), afd on other
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to property rights, one may say that while harassment strips an em-
ployee of one or more of the bundle of contract rights, discharge
divests the employee of the entire bundle. 0 a If one cannot challenge
a discriminatory dismissal, then the right to contract for employ-
ment becomes meaningless. 4 Courts should not "permit[] an em-
grounds, 969 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1992); Frederickson, Note, supra note 29, at 907 (discussing
this approach).
A few courts argue tangentially that discharge implicates not only the right to make, but also
the right to enforce a contract, in the sense that one should have the right to enforce the existence
of a contract. See, e.g., Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1530-31 (11 th Cir. 1991)
(Clark, J., concurring) ("It stands to reason that since schools and employers are forbidden from
refusing to make contracts (admitting children to schools or hiring employees) for racial reasons,
a person discriminated against in either of these contexts can enforce the contract under section
1981 in the event of a termination of the contract for racial reasons."); Birdwhistle v. Kansas
Power & Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 570, 575 (D. Kan. 1989) ("[D]ischarge is directly related to
contract enforcement and thus is still actionable. ... ); see also Ginwright v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 457, 756 F. Supp. 1458, 1472 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing Birdwhiste); EEOC v. DPCE, Inc., No.
89-8696, 1990 LEXIS 5022, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 1990) (citing Birdwhistle); Booth v.
Terminix Int'l, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 675, 676 (D. Kan. 1989) (citing Birdwhistle).
These views seem not to integrate Patterson's restrictions on enforcement claims. See, e.g., But-
ler v. Elwyn Inst., 765 F. Supp. 243, 249 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("Although racially motivated termina-
tions of employment would appear to involve rights concerning the enforcement of contracts,
under Patterson: '[t]he right to enforce contracts does not . . . extend beyond conduct by an
employer which impairs an employee's ability to enforce through legal process his or her estab-
lished contract rights.' Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177-78 .... "); see also supra note 29. These cases
may also improperly collapse the viability of discriminatory discharge with that of retaliatory
discharge. The latter alone is correctly brought under § 1981's enforcement clause, though the
viability of these claims remains contested. See supra note 29.
203. See Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1576-77 (Wald, J., dissenting). In making the analogy between
property and contract rights, Judge Wald also directly evoked the common origin of § 1981 (con-
tract rights) and § 1982 (property rights) in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 1577, 1577 n.4.
She explicitly recalled Supreme Court precedent that the two sections should, when possible, "be
given a common interpretation." Id. at 1577 n.4.
204. Hicks, 902 F.2d at 639 ("The right to make contracts would be rendered virtually mean-
ingless unless it encompasses the right to be free from discriminatory deprivations of such con-
tracts."); Prather, 918 F.2d at 1260 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me that a firing at any
date raises the same concerns as a failure to hire. ... ); Wilmer v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 919
F.2d 1160, 1165 (6th Cir. 1990) (Jones, J., dissenting) ("The argument that Patterson, which
dealt with a racial harassment claim, should limit discriminatory firing claims appears to me to
shortchange the significance of section 1981."); Ginwright, 756 F. Supp. at 1472 ("If § 1981 is to
have any meaning, the creation of the contract and its termination must be seen as two sides to a
single coin.").
Consider the extension of this analysis based on the Prather quotation. Under the majority
view, discharges are generally not actionable. On the other hand, discharges may be actionable if
- like other forms of postformation conduct - they can be used as evidence that an employer
refused to contract initially on nondiscriminatory terms. See, e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S. at 184
(citing the use of racial harassment for such evidence); Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1572; Gonzalez v.
Home Ins. Co., 909 F.2d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 1990); Green v. Bankers Trust, No. 86 Civ. 6591
(CSH), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6945 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1991). The minority view, as in
Judge Boggs' Prather dissent, criticized the particular artificiality of this distinction as applied to
discharge cases. Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1578 (Wald, J., dissenting); Weaver, 922 F.2d at 1530
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ployer to accomplish through the back door what § 1981 will not
permit the employer to do directly. 205
Thus, this analysis maintains that the viability of discharge claims
under § 1981 must be evaluated in a distinctive fashion. While the
Patterson Court insisted that other claims' viability be assessed ac-
cording to whether these claims themselves involve contract forma-
tion, the argument here for § 1981 embracing discharge claims
rests on a distinguishable foundation. Unlike nonviable § 1981
claims such as harassment, discharge implicates the right and af-
fects the very ability to make a contract.
This analysis may seem compromised, however, because of its
similarity to arguments that the Court has rejected. For example,
while the Fourth Circuit Patterson opinion held that harassment
was not viable, it differentiated promotions because, as the Supreme
Court quoted, "'[c]laims of racially discriminatory . . . promotion
go to the very existence and nature of the employment contract and
thus fall easily within § 1981's protection.' "206 However, the Su-
preme Court responded that this "somewhat overstates the case"
and then reiterated that the test is whether a claim such as a pro-
motion itself involves contract formation rather than affects the ex-
istence of a contract. 7
Further and more fundamentally, courts holding discharge claims
not actionable insist that these claims do not implicate the right to
make a contract. °8 Whereas hiring and certain promotion decisions
themselves involve the right to make a contract, discharge only im-
plicates a contract made earlier. Because the contract was estab-
(Clark, J., concurring) ("It defies common sense and logic to hold that section 1981 permits an
action for a discriminatory refusal to hire and then deny an action for a discriminatory dis-
charge."). A response to the minority view is that, despite the unavailability of a discharge action
under § 1981, a plaintiff would still have available causes of action under Title VII and state civil
right statutes. See Prather, 918 F.2d at 1258.
205. Prather, 918 F.2d at 1259 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
206. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986)).
207. Id.
208. Some courts go so far as to maintain that to hold otherwise would undermine Patterson.
See, e.g., Jackson v. GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 734 F. Supp. 258, 265 n.10 (N.D. Tex. 1990)
("This reading of Patterson creates an exception that would swallow up the interpretation the
Patterson Court gives § 1981."); Doffoney v. Board of Trustees for Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist.,
731 F. Supp. 781, 783 (E.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that Patterson requires that courts not unduly
strain the language of § 1981); Coleman v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1528, 1530-31
(S.D. Ala. 1990) (cautioning against an "ingenious construction of the statute" that would permit
discharge claims to go forward).
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lished previously, discharge is not the type of postformation conduct
protected under § 1981.209 Discharge is an issue of the terms and
conditions of employment, a matter of the performance of an ex-
isting contract rather than its formation.2 10 Although promotion and
discharge claims are both classified as involving postformation con-
duct, the only differentiation which distinguishes their viability is
that one may involve contract formation and the other one does not.
Through this perspective, a more unambiguous interpretation can
arguably be given to the Patterson Court's directives that § 1981
"does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation of a
contract . "... ,211 and, more fully, that "the right to make con-
tracts does not extend, as a matter of either logic or semantics, to
conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been estab-
lished, .... . 212
In response to these rulings, those courts holding discharge claims
viable have taken two different approaches. First, some courts con-
tinue to rely, along the lines previously described,1 on the distinc-
tiveness of discriminatory discharge: discharge is different from all
other forms of postformation conduct because it implicates the very
existence of a contract. Discharge, in this view, may not itself in-
volve the making of a contract, but unlike other postformation con-
duct it destroys the contract previously made. More subtle variants
209. See, e.g., Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805, 807-08 (5th
Cir. 1990). Note the difference in analysis between saying that no postformation conduct is pro-
tected and that discharge, because it does not itself involve the right to make a contract, is not the
type of postformation conduct protected by the statute. Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appli-
ance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990) (using language of "type of postformation
* ..conduct"); Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 552, 560 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Courtney).
210. Hayes v. Community Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 940 F.2d 54, 56 (3d Cir. 1991); Carter v.
South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1990); Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630,
657 (8th Cir. 1990) (Fagg, J., dissenting).
211. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d
1565, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting this language).
212. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 177. See, e.g., McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104,
108 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting this language), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991). Of course, what
does it say about the plainness of application when the meaning of a sentence has to be situated in
order to liberate it from ambiguity?
213. See, e.g., Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490 (D. Colo. 1989). Padilla
quoted in support language from the Fourth Circuit Patterson decision that " ' [c] laims of racially
discriminatory hiring, firing, and promotion go to the very existence and nature of the employment
contract and thus fall easily within § 1981 protection.'" Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986)). Recall that the Supreme Court also quoted this
language in part, but challenged the conclusion drawn by the Fourth Circuit. See supra notes
206-07 and accompanying text. For further discussion of this language, see infra note 219.
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of this approach find support for its differentiation between dis-
charge and other forms of postformation conduct in the language of
Patterson itself. The Court stated, for example, that § 1981 pro-
tects contract formation but not the "problems that arise later from
the conditions of continuing employment."21 Elsewhere, the Court
emphasized that "postformation conduct does not involve the right
to make a contract, but rather implicates the performance of estab-
lished contract obligations and the conditions of continuing employ-
ment .... ."115 If "conditions of continuing employment" do not
"involve the right to make a contract," then perhaps discharge does
involve the right to make a contract because it is not a condition of
continuing employment."' It is true, as we have seen, that the
Court also said that "§ 1981 . . . does not apply to conduct which
occurs after the formation of a contract, ' 21 7 but if that statement
were applied to the full extent of its scope it could eliminate protec-
tion not only of discharge claims bit of all promotion claims as
well."' Thus, according to these decisions, if § 1981 excludes pro-
214. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
216. Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1260 (6th Cir. 1990) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Patterson's passages referring to "conditions of continuing employment" and
"postformation conduct"); accord Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565, 1575
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson's passage referring to "postformation
conduct by the employer relating to the terms and conditions of continuing employment"); Wil-
liam E. Mahoney, Jr., Comment, Section 1981 and Discriminatory Discharge: A Contextual
Analysis, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 173, 196-97 (1991) (citing Patterson's passage referring to nonaction-
able behavior such as "conduct by employer after the contract relation has been established" and
"problems that may arise later from the conditions of continuing employment").
217. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171. See also id. at 177 ("[T]he right to make contracts does not
extend . . . to conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established. ... ).
218. To similarly ambiguous effect, when the Court observed that "some overlap will remain"
between § 1981 and Title VII, it pointed as an example of this overlap only to "a refusal to enter
into an employment contract on the basis of race." Id. at 182 (emphasis added). This may be an
indication that the Court did not contemplate that discharges would be an area of overlap, mean-
ing the claims would not be viable under § 1981. On the other hand, it may be that the Court
simply did not consider the role of discharges here. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d
104, 118 (7th Cir. 1990) (Fairchild, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting these
options).
Other courts cite the Court's discussion of the interrelation between § 1981 and Title VII as
having less ambiguous implications for discharge claims. As seen previously, some courts have
suggested the availability of Title VII mitigates any awkwardness in denying § 1981 discharge
claims. See supra note 204. By contrast, some courts that have held discharge claims viable main-
tain that the Patterson Court's interest in protecting Title VII's mediation and conciliation proce-
dures against overlap by a § 1981 action, see 491 U.S. at 180-82, is not a problem at discharge
"because the interest in preserving the integrity of Title VII procedures is lessened considerably
when an employment relationship does not exist." Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 640-
41 (8th Cir. 1990); Kriegel v. Home Ins. Co., 739 F. Supp. 1538, 1540 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (quoting
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tection only of matters of continuing employment, then discharges
should be actionable. 19 More modestly, the Court's focus on exclud-
ing conditions of continuing employment suggests that its directive
was not formulated with the intention of excluding discharge claims
from coverage, and that opens the way for the alternative analysis
these courts have proposed.
2. Discharge as Refusal to Contract
As just discussed, some courts have responded to the charge that
discharge is postformation conduct and so not a viable cause of ac-
tion under § 1981 by claiming that discharge affects the right to
contract. A second, distinguishable approach protecting the viability
of discharge claims resists the notion that discharge itself does not
involve contract formation. Rather than insisting that not only con-
tract formation but conduct- annulling prior contract formation
should be actionable, the argument here is that discharge does in-
volve contract formation, or more precisely, an employer's refusal to
form a contract. "[O]ne facet of termination of employment is a
refusal to enter into a contract for the future, and thus termination
is a violation of § 1981 if based on race. ' 220 This focus attends not
Hicks). This seems to minimize that following discharge, mediation and conciliation procedures
may be instrumental in effectuating reinstatement. See. e.g., Prather, 918 F.2d at 1257; Trujillo v.
Grand Junction Regional Ctr., 928 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1991); Carter v. South Cent. Bell,
912 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1990); Ceesay v. Miller, Mason & Dickenson, No. 90-2800, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10876 at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 1990).
219. Another possible argument here would pursue the Court's quotation of the Fourth Circuit
Patterson opinion. The full text of that quotation reads: "Claims of racially discriminatory hiring,
firing, and promotion go to the very existence and nature of the employment contract and thus fall
easily within § 1981's protection." Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th
Cir. 1986) (emphasis added), affd in part, vacated in part, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The Court's
abbreviation of the quotation may have arisen for a variety of reasons: the context of the discus-
sion was promotion cases only, the Court wanted to leave application to discharge claims open, the
Court believed discharge claims appropriately fell under the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, and so on.
Yet while the Court's decision only to partially quote the Fourth Circuit opinion has indetermi-
nate implications for discharge claims, the quotation at least suggests that the Court had the
opportunity to foreclose protection of these claims and did not explicitly choose to do so.
220. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 118 (Fairchild, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); see
also Williams v. Avco Lycoming, 755 F. Supp. 47, 51 (D. Conn. 1991) (allowing a claim under
§ 1981 to stand where plaintiff alleged that he was fired and his employer refused to rehire him
because of the employee's race); Tillman v. Beaver Express Serv., Inc., No. 89-1326-K, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2519, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 1991); Kozam v. Emerson Electric Co., 739 F. Supp.
307, 313 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (allowing action under § 1981 where plaintiff allegedly was fired and
his employer refused to offer him an alternative position because of the employee's race). This
argument has found some favor among commentators. See, e.g., Player, supra note 26, at 199-200
("A termination, or discharge, is a way of articulating the employer's expressed refusal to offer a
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to the action undertaken under the previous contract but to the in-
dependent action whereby the employer refuses to contract anew.2 21
When faced with this argument, a number of courts have ob-
jected to this reasoning in frontal terms. They concluded that such
an approach not only seeks to evade but also completely subverts the
Patterson holding that postformation conduct is not actionable.2 22
They perceived its emphasis on the remaking of contracts to perpet-
uate the type of reasoning advanced by Justice Stevens in Patter-
son23 and soundly rejected by the Court."4 These lower courts con-
cluded that an employee should not be able to avoid the fact of
discharge - or the lack of its viability under § 1981 - by claiming
a new employment relationship was sought." 5
This response has some strong initial persuasiveness. At first
glance it does seem that the attempted separation of discharge and
refusal to contract is mere artful pleading, a sleight of hand, and an
evasion of what Patterson demands. Yet I would suggest that this
response is itself too simplistic. Consider whether in the following
cases the alleged moment of contract renewal is rightly subservient
to and properly treated conceptually as inseparable from the mo-
ment of discharge. If a person is terminated and then seeks to be
renewed contractual relationship."); Merrick T. Rossein, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 7
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 95, 118-19 (1990) ("Formal employment contracts are not ordinary. If
one exists, the dismissal would involve two contracts - the old contract the employer is terminat-
ing, and the new contract into which the employer refuses to enter.").
221. Relying on the Patterson language in the promotion context that the test of viability is
whether employer and employee achieve "a new and distinct relation," a few judicial opinions do
not concentrate on the employer's refusal to contract but on the fact that the discharge creates "a
new and distinct relation" between the parties. 491 U.S. at 185. See, e.g., Taggart v. Jefferson
County Child Support Enforcement Unit, 935 F.2d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1991) (McMillan, J., dis-
senting); Prather, 918 F.2d at 1261 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
222. See, e.g., Holland v. First Va. Banks, Inc., 937 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(criticizing the sidestepping of Patterson); Gregory v. Harris-Teeter Supermarkets, Inc., 728 F.
Supp. 1259, 1262-63 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (viewing this reasoning to unduly stretch § 1981's mean-
ing); Drake v. Jewel Co., No. 87 C 8545, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10532, at *6 (N.D. II. Aug. 13,
1990) (holding that this reasoning would circumvent Patterson); Williams v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp., No. 89-6661, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1990); Rick
Nolan's Auto Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 721, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that
this reasoning "would completely vitiate the ruling in Patterson . and that the result is
"absurd").
223. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 221 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part).
224. See. e.g., Brereton v. Communications Satellite Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1085, 1088-89
(D.D.C. 1990) (noting that "the great creativity of this argument is inversely proportional to the
acceptance that it has garnered" and citing the rejection of this interpretation by the Patterson
Court and post-Patterson lower courts).
225. Drake, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7044, at *5.
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hired back to their now vacant position, should a discriminatory fail-
ure to hire be subsumed under the discharge? 226 What if the failure
to renew occurs at the end of a stated term of service? 227 Would we
approach a case differently if the failure to renew is not for employ-
ment but for a housing lease? 228 If a new employer takes over an old
contract, is the severance of an employee a discharge or a failure to
contract? 22 9 What if the allegedly new contract sought to be created
does not embrace merely the old terms but new ones? 2 0 Should it
make a difference whether, after discharge, the new position sought
within the former place of employment is not one's old position but
a different one? 281 What if the new position could be considered
226. Snell v. City & County of Denver, No. 92-1370, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17091, at *11-12
(10th Cir. July 2, 1993) (deciding on merits rather than on viability of action where former police
officer applied for department position ten years after initial termination), tabled at, 999 F.2d 548
(10th Cir. 1993); see also Alexander v. U.S. Ecology, Inc., 956 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that failure to rehire cause of action survived where plaintiff sought old job after having been
terminated one year previously).
227. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding
§ 1981 claim not actionable where charge is discriminatory refusal to continue business contract,
whose terms renewed automatically on monthly basis), vacated on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 960
(1992); Durrani v. Valdosta Technical Inst., 810 F. Supp. 301, 305 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (holding no
cause of action for nonrenewal of teacher contract); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F.
Supp. 461, 471 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that failure to rehire claim failed where hospital staff
privileges were subject to annual renewal), on further consideration, 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill.
1993); Russell v. District of Columbia, 747 F. Supp. 72, 76 (D.D.C. 1990) (ruling that cause of
action survived where fire company refused to rehire fire fighter at expiration of stated term of
employment); Chawla v. Klapper, 743 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (N.D. III. 1990) (holding not actiona-
ble employer decision not to renew year to year contract); see also Player, supra note 26, at 200
(maintaining that failure to offer professor contract for next academic year could be considered
refusal to contract, citing the pre-Patterson § 1983 case of Delaware State College v. Ricks, 479
U.S. 250 (1980)).
228. Ward v. Harte, 794 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding of liability under § 1981 on
basis of offensive collateral estoppel; § 1981 claim treated as refusal to renew lease).
229. Compare Baker v. Elmwood Dist., Inc., 940 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
termination by new employer was a discharge, not a failure to hire) with Carter v. O'Hare Hotel
Investors, No. 88 C 10713, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2439 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 1990) (holding viable
a new employer's failure to hire current employee).
230. See, e.g., Craig v. Ohio Dept. of Admin. Servs., 790 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (dis-
cussing situation where minority contractor previously hired for demolition work allegedly discov-
ered that specifications for job had been discriminatorily presented; contractor was refused a
change order, and had to terminate contract; court rejected argument that refusal of change order
constituted discriminatory refusal to contract).
231. See, e.g., Williams v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Corp., No. 91-4221-C, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8198, at *2 (D. Kan. May 3, 1993) (treating as discharge and deciding on merits
case of employer refusal to recall employee to a job in another craft position); Von Zuckerstein v.
Argonne Nat'l Lab., 760 F. Supp. 1310, 1315-16 (N.D. Il. 1991) (holding viable failure to rehire
after layoff, when new positions opened; layoff here held to be equivalent to termination, so issue
is one of contract formation), rev'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1993) (as-
suming cause of action viable but reversing on the merits); Kozam v. Emerson Electric Co., 739 F.
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comparable to a promotion? 232
To sort out what properly should be considered an action for dis-
criminatory discharge (and therefore postformation conduct) from
what properly should be characterized a discriminatory refusal to
contract (and therefore formation conduct), a sounder analytic clas-
sification is required. Courts have responded to this challenge by ar-
ticulating two basic approaches." First, courts have generally re-
jected the argument that a new contract is implicated simply by
virtue of the fact that termination occurs to an at-will employee. As
explained in an influential opinion by Judge Posner:
We are mindful of the argument that employment at will . . . should be
analyzed not as a single contract but as a series of fresh contracts made
every day of continued employment; on this view, termination on racial
grounds prevents the employee from making the next day's contract of em-
ployment, and is therefore actionable. This analysis is artificial . . . . Em-
ployment at will is not a state of nature but a continuing contractual rela-
tion. Wages, benefits, duties, working conditions, and all (but one) of the
other terms are specified and a breach of any of them will give the employee
a cause of action for breach of contract. All that is missing is a provision
that gives the contract a fixed term or that entitles one or b6th parties to a
specified amount of notice before the other party can cancel the contract
without liability. A contract for employment at will may end abruptly but it
is a real and continuing contract nonetheless, not a series of contracts each a
Supp. 307, 313 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (holding action viable where employee sought new position
within firm); Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485, 490 n.4 (D. Colo. 1989) (ruling
actionable a failure to rehire claim viable where, upon discharge, employee was classified with
"Ineligible for Rehire" status; this classification prevented future employment contract of any
kind between employee and employer), rev'd, 950 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1991).
232. See. e.g., Williams v. Greendolf, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
action viable where employee was discharged at end of temporary employment and did not receive
promised permanent position); cf Holland v. Boar. of Trustees of Univ. of D.C., 794 F. Supp.
420, 424 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding failure to contract claim viable where administrator was not
provided promised permanent position); see also Shanor & Marcosson, supra note 29, at 172
n. 113 (maintaining that discriminatory decision to deny faculty member tenure presents both a
non-actionable discharge claim and a viable refusal to contract claim).
233. Though not cast in the analytic framework presented here, for a good, early presentation
of the way courts have proceeded in this area, see Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 765 F.
Supp. 461, 469-70 (N.D. III. 1991), on further consideration, 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. I11. 1993).
In contrast to the two approaches to be discussed in the text, some courts have chosen, at least
in the actions presented to them, not to recognize that refusal to rehire might in some circum-
stances be properly treated differently than discharge: See, e.g., Smith v. Petra Cablevision Corp.,
793 F. Supp. 417, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (ruling, without further inquiry, that the § 1981 claim
alleged when an employer refused to rehire a minority employee to another position, although the
employer habitually did so for similarly situated white employees, was simply a matter of discrim-
inatory discharge and, therefore, barred); Hayes v. Community Gen. Osteopathic Hosp., 730 F.
Supp. 1333, 1335 (M.D. Pa. 1990) ("A discharge does not create a new and distinct contractual
relationship. To the contrary, it destroys and terminates any prior relationship."), aff'd, 940 F.2d
54 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 940 (1992).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:259
day - or a minute - long.18'
The discharge does not prevent contract formation, because the next
day's employment is not a new contract but part of a "continuing
contractual relation." In this light the employee's objection is to the
employer's postformation conduct. This analysis has been extended
to deny § 1981 claims where the alleged "new" contract was not at-
will but derived from monthly or yearly renewals. 3 5
Under the second approach, courts acknowledge that the refusal
to renew a contract generally arises as part of an ongoing relation-
ship. Yet they hold that certain types of contract "renewals" may in
fact create a new contractual relationship between employee and
employer. Here the courts have extended to discharge/refusal to
contract claims the Patterson Court's analysis of promotion claims.
They evaluate whether the proposed contract either rose to the level
of a "new" contract with the employer or created a "new and dis-
tinct relation" between employee and employer.23 Most courts that
have applied either of these tests to contract renewal claims have
not found it difficult to do. Because the position the employee sought
was typically the same one from which he or she had been dis-
charged, the contract would not have been "new" nor the employ-
234. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (cita-
tions omitted), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 419 (1991); accord Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc.,
931 F.2d 1565, 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 960 (1992). But see
Alfred W. Blumrosen, The 1989 Supreme Court Rulings Concerning Employment Discrimination
and Affirmative Action: A Minefield for Employers and a Gold Mine for Their Lawyers, 15
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 175, 181 (1989) (maintaining that where employment is at-will, "[a] new
contract [is] continually being made;" therefore discriminatory discharge may create actionable
"'new contract' " because based on unequal terms).
Interestingly, neither Judge Posner's opinion in McKnight nor the D.C. Circuit decision in
Gersman anywhere directly relies on or cites in support the Supreme Court's rejection, see Patter-
son v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 n.6 (1989), of Justice Stevens' argument that
"[an at-will employee . . . is constantly remaking (a] contract." Id. at 221. This may suggest
that the debate in the Patterson Court revolved around activity during an employment relation-
ship and not activity at its termination. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 118 (Fairchild, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part). Therefore, it requires an extension of the Court's holding to apply it to
discriminatory discharges, and this is the argument that Judge Posner undertakes. But see Shanor
& Marcosson, supra note 29, at 172 (arguing that non-application to termination is implicit in the
Supreme Court's rejection of Justice Stevens' dissent).
235. See, e.g., Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1572-73 (denying claim to n automatically renewable
monthly contract); Chawla v. Klapper, 743 F. Supp. 1284, 1290-91 (N.D. III. 1990) (finding the
discharge of employee who worked under a year-to-year contract to be postformation conduct
where the "[p]laintiffs relationship with [his employer] was akin to that of an at-will employee.
[The fact] [tihat he had a 'guaranteed' term of employment is not significant for purposes of the
Patterson analysis").
236. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185.
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ment relationship "new and distinct."2 ' Where, however, an em-
ployee was seeking a new position within his or her former company,
some courts have found the difference sufficient under the Patterson
Court's test to create a viable claim.2 38
Setting aside the ultimate merits of these decisions, what deserves
attention is the very fact of the analytic distinction between the sec-
ond type of inquiry and the first.23 9 If Judge Posner's observation
237. For examples of courts using the "new and distinct" relationship test to deny claims alleg-
ing a failure to rehire to a former position of employment, see Jackson v. Boeing Co., 982 F.2d
528 (10th Cir. 1992); Baker v. Elmwood Dist., Inc., 940 F.2d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 1991); Hull v.
Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd., 926 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied
sub nom. Hull v. Shuck, 501 U.S. 1261 (1991); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 461 F.
Supp. 461, 471, (N.D. Ill. 1991), on further consideration, 824 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. I11. 1993);
Boyd v. Telecable of Overland Park, 752 F. Supp. 388, 391 (D. Kan. 1990); Smith v. Continental
Ins. Co., 747 F. Supp. 275, 282 (D.N.J. 1990), affd, 941 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1991); McCullough
v. Certified Tool & Mfg. Corp., No. 89 C 4598, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2608, at 6-7 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 7, 1990); Jones v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., No. 89 C 7105, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 501, at
*10 (N.D. II1. Jan. 17, 1990); Carter v. O'Hare Hotel Investors, 736 F. Supp. 158, 160 (N.D. I11.
1989), on further consideration, Carter v. O'Hare Hotel Investors, No. 88 C 10713, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2439 (N.D. I11. May 14, 1990); Eklof v. Bramalea Ltd., 733 F. Supp. 935, 937 (E.D.
Pa. 1989).
For examples of courts using the "new" contract test to deny similar rehire claims, see
Gersman, 931 F.2d at 1573; Chawla, 743 F. Supp. at 1291; Rick Nolan's Auto Body Shop v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 721, 722 (N.D. I11. 1989). More bold are courts that deny that a
refusal to rehire claim could ever consist of an employee's "new" relationship with a former em-
ployer. See, e.g., White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1545 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(quoting Morgan v. Kansas City Transp. Auth., 720 F. Supp. 758 (W.D. Mo. 1989)), affd, 939
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1991); Morgan, 720 F. Supp. at 760 n.2 ("The court cannot conceive of a
situation where the decision to discharge an employee would involve a 'change in position ...
involv[ing] the opportunity to enter into a new contract with the employer'...."). But see Jones
v. United States Postal Serv., No. 89-399-CMW, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 821, at *17 n.19 (D.
Del. Jan. 26, 1990) ("This court believes that a contract renewal is analogous to a promotion in
that it may be construed as an opportunity to enter into a new contract. The court thus believes
that refusal to renew a contract ...may state a claim under § 1981.").
238. Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 760 F. Supp. 1310, 1315-16 (N.D. III. 1991)
(discussing failure to promote claim), rev'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir.
1993) (assuming viability of claim but reversing on the merits); Toliver v. Sullivan Diagnostic
Treatment Ctr., 748 F. Supp. 223, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Kozam v. Emerson Electric Co., 739
F. Supp. 307, 313 (N.D. Miss. 1990). But see Smith v. Petra Cablevision Corp., 793 F. Supp.
417, 418 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (treating refusal to renew contract claim simply as discharge claim
even though employee sought different position).
239. For an example of this differentiation, consider the following:
Carter's legal conclusion that her employment relationship consisted of an ongoing
series of daily unilateral contracts is not accepted by this court. To the extent that the
complaint alleges a § 1981 claim based upon a racially motivated termination, it is
precluded by Patterson. . . . Similarly, to the extent the complaint alleges a racially
motivated decision to not rehire her, it fails to state a claim under § 1981. Reinstate-
ment of the identical employment relationship, with the same rights, duties and obli-
gations of the old agreement, is not a new and distinct relation covered by § 1981.
Carter v. O'Hare Hotel Investors, 736 F. Supp. 158, 160 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (emphases added); see
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quoted above 240 were read in isolation, one might obtain the mis-
taken impression that a contract renewal claim should necessarily be
denied where the contract concerns an at-will employee. Because the
contractual relationship is ongoing, this theory would hold that the
challenged employer's action by definition must be classified as
postformation conduct. Yet reference to the Court's analysis of pro-
motion claims demonstrates the inadequacies of this assessment. A
promotion or refusal to contract claim may derive from an ongoing
relationship and still give rise to a "new" contractual relationship. A
refusal to hire "is analogous to a promotion in that both involve a
change in the employment relationship that may be described as
formation-like in certain respects but, nonetheless, also present
strong aspects of contractual continuity."24' While it may be the
case, then, that an at-will contract is not by definition "new" each
day the contract is "remade," neither is it - or other contractual
relationships - by definition not new because it derives from a rela-
tionship previously ongoing. The "new" relationship exists within
the borders of the continuing relationship.
This returns us to the question pursued throughout application of
the Patterson Court's interpretation of § 1981: how easy is it ulti-
mately to distinguish the moment of contract formation, which is
actionable under Patterson, from the moment of postcontract for-
mation, which is not? Even if we assume that under Patterson it is
inappropriate to hold discharge claims viable because they implicate
- completely undo - an earlier contract formation, we are not
home free. Intuitively, discharge seems to mark the end of a con-
tractual relationship; as such, it should easily be termed postforma-
tion conduct, since it does not itself involve contract formation. Yet
this intuition is inadequate because we must consider the discharge
within the context of the potentially continuing relationship between
employer and employee. If we did not, then the discharge would end
one contractual relationship and subsequent attempts to be rehired
also Shanor & Marcosson, supra note 29, at 172, 172 n.1 13 (noting that § 1981 refusal to renew
contract claims generally do not survive Patterson Court's rejection of Justice Stevens' argument
that contract is process of constant renewal; yet arguing that if discharge entails discrimination in
formation of different relationship than one terminated, claim should survive).
240. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
241. Jones v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., No. 89 C 7105, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 501 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 17, 1990) (ultimately rejecting plaintiff's § 1981 rehire claim because the position sought




could be considered contract formation. As we have also seen, how-
ever, it is insufficient to define discharge as conduct within a poten-
tially ongoing relationship and, therefore, as postformation conduct.
Like promotions, discharges themselves may involve contract forma-
tion. And as in promotion cases, the potential difficulty of defining
at which point a relationship is sufficiently "new" to create a viable
§ 1981 exemplifies the difficulty in defining when the relationship
does or does not change.
Many of these points were developed in the prior discussion of
promotion claims 242 and do not require reiteration here. But the
nexus of discharge claims and refusal to rehire claims moves the
analysis to a higher level. Just as in the difficulty of sorting out via-
ble from nonviable promotion claims, here the dilemma is distin-
guishing nonviable discharge claims from viable refusal to hire
claims. As we have seen, several matters are at stake in resolving
this issue. How do we sort out whether the Patterson Court's inter-
pretation of the meaning of § 1981 adequately addresses applica-
tion of this meaning to discharge claims? Should we assume that a
viable discharge claim must itself involve the making of a contract?
Even if we do so, is invocation of the Court's analysis of promotion
claims appropriate? Why do most courts assume that Patterson re-
quires that for a discharge or refusal to hire to be actionable it must
rise to the level of a "new" or "new and distinct" contractual rela-
tionship? More particularly, why should we require in the discharge
context that a "new and distinct" contractual relationship be
marked by a qualitative change from the old? Why is it not enough
that one contract has ended and another begun (or been refused by
the employer)? Judge Posner has observed that promotion cases
may arguably be differentiated depending on whether an employee
new to the firm would be hired to the position at issue.2 3 Only this
standard, Judge Posner stated, would prevent the "anomaly" of
someone outside the firm being able to sue for a discriminatory re-
fusal to hire while an employee discriminatorily refused a promotion
to the same position would not be.244 Should not the same logic be
applied - perhaps be even more properly applied - to discharge
242. See supra notes 124-54 and accompanying text.
243. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (proffering




and refusal to hire cases? 24 5 Should it matter that this logic implies
that were an employee to be rehired to a former position, a contract
is "made" under § 1981 even where no change in the terms of the
contract occurs?
In a dissenting D.C. Circuit opinion, Judge Wald spoke of the
majority view differentiating discharge from refusal to hire as de-
pending "almost entirely on drawing very fine and formal distinc-
tions among ...concepts ...even when actual events indicate
that any or all of these concepts might apply. 246 She then argued:
The real world of contract belies such stark formalisms. In the context of
automatically renewing contracts ... termination and a refusal to renew
are, for all intents and purposes, the same thing. In such situations, it is
pointless (or, what is worse, conclusory) to quibble over whether the cancel-
lation of a contract is "preformation" or "postformation" conduct - cancel-
lation is both: it is both the end of an existing contract and a refusal to enter
into a new contract. Despite these realities, the majority's analysis hangs
precariously upon such ethereal distinctions. "
Judge Wald's solution was to apply Patterson's interpretation of
§ 1981's protection of the right to make a contract as prohibiting
someone, whether in a refusal to contract, discharge, or refusal to
renew a contract, "from refusing to stand in a contractual relation-
ship with another party solely because of that party's race.'"248
Would this or Judge Posner's proposal open the door to many more
§ 1981 claims? Certainly. Would this be contrary to Patterson?
That is unclear. It should be underscored, however, that these pro-
posals do attempt to be faithful to the Court's insistence that
"[slection 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of ra-
cial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, for it ex-
pressly prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforcement
of contracts. 249
245. Rossein, supra note 220, at 119 (making a similar argument).
246. Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 931 F.2d 1565, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Wald, J.,
dissenting).
247. Id. at 1576.
248. Id. at 1578.




Application of the Court's interpretation of the meaning of
§ 1981 presents difficulties that the Court did not expect or foresee.
The point at which a contract can be said to be "made," and the
point at which it changes or does not change, is not anywhere near
as evident as the Court had anticipated. As the epigraphs that begin
this Article reveal, a particularly fascinating consequence is the
nexus between the interpretive and substantive inquiries at issue in
the post-Patterson cases: it may be equally as subtle to determine
when a contract is re-made as it is to determine when, in the process
of application, a statute is re-made. Ironically, in a case involving
difficult substantive assessment of when a contract is re-made, the
Patterson Court may be faulted for a falsely contractualist interpre-
tive model that holds a statute is only made, never re-made.2 50
APPENDIX: THE POST-PATTERSON CASES
The following cases comprise all cases that have made reference
to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). The listing is drawn from published
cases, unpublished cases on electronic databases, and unpublished
cases cited by other courts or commentators.
Case Summary
The case summary includes all those decisions from the larger
case list whose § 1981 cause of action was affected by Patterson.
(These cases are marked in the larger case list by introductory let-
ters which depict the causes of action claimed). This summary ex-
cludes decisions in the case list which mention Patterson but where
250. If the analogy between contract and statutory interpretation were to be pursued, it would
be worthwhile to analyze concepts of relational contract as developed by such scholars as Ian
Macneil. See, e.g., IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Relational Contract:
What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483; Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term
Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L.
REV. 854 (1978); The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). Some work in
this area has been begun by Peter Strauss. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is Not the
Primary Official With Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legisla-
tive History. 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 321, 328 (1990) (analogizing to relational contract as the
model for agency interpretation of statutes). As Strauss recognizes, see id. at 328 n.24, analogy
between relational contract and statutory interpretation may provide additional support for theo-
ries of dynamic statutory interpretation such as proposed by William Eskridge. See, e.g., WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
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Patterson had no bearing on the viability of the cause of action. It
thus excludes cases where the court assumed or did not reach the
viability of a cause of action under Patterson but decided the case
on the merits. Included are cases where the cause of action survived
under Patterson but the court held against the plaintiff on the
merits.
This summary generally includes no more than one count of each
cause of action per case and does not distinguish cases with multiple
plaintiffs.
Claims or causes of action ("coa"):
I. Right to make a contract:







8. Refusal to renew contract:
SUBTOTAL:





III. Miscellaneous or nonenumerated
coa:
IV. Equal benefit, etc. clauses:








































CD = Constructive Discharge
D = Discriminatory Discharge (or termination)
Dm = Demotion
E = Enforce
EB = Equal Benefits (or give evidence, etc.)
H = Harassment (or discriminatory conditions)
M = Miscellaneous (or unspecified)
P = Promotion
R = Retaliation
RD = Retaliatory Discharge
RK = Refusal to Contract
RR = Refusal to Renew Contract (or refusal to rehire)
T = Transfer
Where a claim below is italicized, the highest court to hear the
case ruled that if the plaintiff's factual claims were proven, the
plaintiff presented a viable § 1981 claim. The court therefore allowed
the claim to go forward (it survived summary judgment, was re-
manded, was successful or denied on the merits, etc.); if not under-
lined, the claim was dismissed.
The Post-PATTERSON Cases
H,P,T Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 751 F. Supp.
1548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
Adams v. City of Chicago, 865 F. Supp. 445
(N.D. Ill. 1994).
D,H Adams v. Lever Bros. Co., 734 F. Supp. 815, on
further consideration, No. 87 C 9037, 1990








Aiken v. Bucks Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 61
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 652 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 14, 1991), on reconsideration, 799 F.
Supp. 522 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
Alexander v. Gerhardt Enter., Inc., 40 F.3d 187
(7th Cir. 1994).
Alexander v. Jefferson Parish, No. 89-4673,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1326 (E.D. La. Feb. 6,
1990).
Alexander v. NY Medical College, 721 F.
Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Alexander v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259, No.
92-1550-PFK, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18603
(D. Kan. Dec. 30, 1993).
Alexander v. U.S. Ecology, Inc., 956 F.2d 268
(6th Cir. 1992) (table).
Allen v. City of Chicago, 828 F. Supp. 543
(1993).
Allen v. Denver Publ. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978
(10th Cir.1991).
Allen v. District of Columbia, 812 F. Supp.
1239 (D.D.C. 1993).
Allen v. McEntee, 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 867 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 1993).
Allensworth v. General Motors Corp., 945 F.2d




Sys., Inc., 52 Fair Empl.
828 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
Amos v. U.S. W. Communications, 986 F.2d
1426 (10th Cir. 1993) (table).
Anderson v. United Auto Workers, 738 F.
Supp. 441 (D. Kan. 1990).
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P Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 55 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 532 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5,
1989).
D Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540
(6th Cir. 1991).
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206
(1992).
RK Aragon v. Columbia Univ., 9 F.3d 1550 (9th
Cir. 1993) (table).
Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62 (5th
Cir. 1993).
Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
P Arnett v. Davis County Sch. Dist., 62 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1184 (D. Utah Apr. 5,
1993).
RR Artis v. U.S. Indust., 720 F. Supp. 105 (N.D.
Ill. 1989), affd sub nom. Artis v. Hitachi Zosen
Clearing, Inc., 967 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1992).
D Asare v. Syms, Inc., 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1049 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1989).
H Askew v. May Merchandising Corp., No. 87
Civ. 7835, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1919
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991).
H,RD Assa'ad-Faltas v. Commonwealth of Va., 738 F.
Supp. 982 (E.D. Va. 1989).
RR Atkins v. Boeing Co., No. 91-1404-MLB, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7394 (D. Kan. MAy 5,
1993).
D,H,RD Atluru v. Anesthesia Serv. Medical Group, 62
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1696 (D. Kan.
May 7, 1991).
D Bailey v. Johnsen, No. 90 C 01795, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10436 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1990).
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H Bailey v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 910
F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1990).
D,P Baker v. Elmwood Distrib., Inc., No. 83 C
0215, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5644 (N.D. Ill.
May 11, 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir.
1991).
D Baker v. Gulf & W. Indus., 961 F.2d 222 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (table), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 965
(1992).
H Bank Realty, Inc. v. Practical Management
Technology, Inc., No. HAR-88-3681, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7480 (D. Md. June 15, 1990),
affid, 935 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1991) (table).
Dm Bapat v. Connecticut Dept. of Health Serv., 815
F. Supp. 525 (D. Conn. 1992).
H,RD Barefield v. Scanlon, No. 86-2407-WF, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6166 (D. Mass. May 15,
1990).
Barnes v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., No.
93-3644, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15999 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 7, 1994).
H,P Barnum v. Pacific Bell, 931 F.2d 896 (9th Cir.
1991) (table).
Dm Barr v. Wittek Mfg. Co., No. 87 C 2940, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2302 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5,
1990).
D Barringer v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 902
F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (table).
Barron v. Sullivan, No. 93 C 6644, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11408 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1994).
Bartek v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 882
F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1989).
H,P,RD Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d
1370 (11th Cir. 1992).




Dm,H Becton v. Burlington N. R.R., 878 F.2d 1436
(6th Cir. 1989) (table).
Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp.
781, on further consideration, 723 F. Supp. 635
(N.D. Ala. 1989).
T Bell v. Krogers, Inc., 897 F.2d 529 (6th Cir.
1990) (table).
P Bennun v. Rutgers, 737 F. Supp. 1393 (D.N.J.
1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 941 F.2d
154 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom.,
Rutgers v. Bennun, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
D,H Bernard v. Volunteers of Am., No. 89-Z-408
(D. Colo. 1989).
H Bernhard v. Doskocil Co., 861 F. Supp. 1006
(D. Kan. 1994).
Dm,T,R Berry v. General Motors Corp., 796 F. Supp.
1409 (D. Kan. 1992).
P Berry v. Stinson Chevrolet, 804 F. Supp. 121
(D. Colo. 1992).
D Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 723
F. Supp. 570 (D. Kan. 1989).
D Blanding v. Pennsylvania State Police, 811 F.
Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1992), affrd, 12 F.3d
1303 (3d Cir. 1993).
H Blount v. Alabama Coop. Extension Serv., No.
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